25870 1/25/2005 15:26 05BUCHAREST229 Embassy Bucharest CONFIDENTIAL 05BUCHAREST212 This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000229
STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2015 TAGS: MARR, MASS, PGOV, PREL, RS, RO, NATO SUBJECT: TEXT OF ROMANIA'S "INTEGRATED APPROACH" PROPOSAL FOR BLACK SEA REGION SECURITY COOPERATION
REF: BUCHAREST 212
Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF ROBERT GILCHRIST FOR REASONS 1.4 A, B AND D
1. (C) The Foreign Ministry delivered to Embassy officers January 19 an outline classified by the Romanians as "confidential" and titled "A Basis for an Integrated Approach for Security Cooperation in the Black Sea Region. Building Synergy Among Various Initiatives." Post reproduces below the text of this outline. As discussed in reftel, the Romanians view the proposal as a basis for further consultation with U.S. on coordination on Black Sea security.
2. (C) BEGIN TEXT OF OUTLINE:
Basis for an Integrated Approach for Security Cooperation in the Black Sea Region.
Building synergy among various initiatives
-Enhancing regional security is part of a wider effort to consolidate stability and democracy, as well as to ensure economic development in the Black Sea region and to anchor it to the Euro-Atlantic community.
-The variety of security risks and their cross-border nature require combined actions on the following dimensions: maritime, air, land security, border security and civil emergency planning.
-While the security in the Black Sea region is a responsibility of the littoral states, cooperation with and involvement of other international organizations, in particular NATO, can optimize the existing regional cooperation efforts.
Several arguments support this approach:
The trans-national character of the risks in the Black Sea; The main targets of the illegal activities in the Black Sea are our allies in the Western Europe, not only the riparian states, and therefore, we cannot exclude cooperation with them in support of Black Sea security;
The inclusive approach we all three have claimed, as non-EU members, from the ESOP development should be applied to the Black Sea security, indivisibly linked to the Euro-Atlantic security.
-Security cooperation in the Black Sea region should be construed in such a manner that would benefit all regional states ("win-win solution");
-Any initiative aimed at strengthening security in the Black Sea region has to be pursued in full observance with international law and national legislation.
-2. Components of an integrated approach we could explore:
-Enhancing political debates in NATO on the security situation in the Black Se region. The developments in Georgia, Ukraine, and R. Moldova are discussed in NATO but an integrated debate could be useful in streamlining NATO ties with its Partners in the Black Sea region;
-Building awareness and interest for the Black Sea security issues in NATO ("a Black Sea caucus");
-Developing NATO individual political dialogue with the Partners in the Black Sea region. The Individual Partnership Action Plans offer a very good framework in this regard;
-Generating debate on the Black Sea region in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly which can be a link for the parliaments in the Partner countries.
-Building awareness on the Black Sea region through public diplomacy instruments (joint events, seminars, etc.)
a) Maritime Security:
-- An integrated project for the Black Sea could be explored in the following manner:
- A Black Sea Task Force of the three NATO allies, built upon Turkey's operation Black Sea Harmony, and connected with NATO command and information exchange structures.
The mission of this Task Force would be to help complete data regarding the naval situation in the Black Sea (Recognized Maritime Picture) and potentially to ensure escort for commercial vessels.
Non-Black Sea allies could be invited to patrol with the Black Sea Task Force within the limitations of the Montreux Convention; this would help alleviate the costs of the Black Sea Task Force for the three Black Sea allies.
The Task Force could be under Turkey's lead, but connected to NATO command structure and exchanging information with OAE;
We should study the Gibraltar Task Force of OAE, comprising almost exclusively Portuguese and Spanish military vessels, which operate under NATO umbrella escorting ships through Gibraltar Straits. It could be an example for a possible future NATO mission of the Black Sea Task Force.
The Task Force can be supported by the Blackseafor through a mechanism of information exchange to be established, based upon a memorandum of understanding among the littoral states;
The Task Force can interact with Blackseafor during its activations.
Information exchange and command support for the Black Sea Task Force;
Joint patrolling by non-Black Sea allies with the Black Sea Task Force, in accordance with the Montreux Convention.
Possibility to develop a NATO operation in the Black Sea in the future, by taking over the Black Sea Task Force.
BLACKSEAFOR would develop its role in preventing terrorism and WMD trafficking within the scope of the current Agreement, through:
-enhancing information exchange among the participating states and with the Black Sea Task Force;
-organizing thematic exercises and training, including with participation NATO or allied states;
-"consequence management" missions, which can also support the Black Sea Initiative on civil defense. A possible collaboration of Blackseafor with EADRCC could be explored.
-elaboration of common, inter-operable concepts, techniques and specific anti-terrorism procedures. NATO experience and the PAP - T could be used as reference.
Accepting NATO allies as observers to the Blackseafor.
Participation aside the Black Sea Task Force during Blackseafor activations.
Openness and connection with a NATO role in the Black Sea is an essential aspect of developing Blackseafor role in preventing terrorism.
b) Land and air security: BLACK SEA REGIONAL COOPERATION - the possibility of creating and operating a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)
-A JIATF for the Black Sea (JIATF-Black Sea) region, integrating law enforcement, customs and defense assets of the participating countries could be useful for a comprehensive response to illegal activities in the Black Sea region.
-The JIATF used by the United States in Key West, Florida, could be a good model to depart from and should be carefully considered by the BSEC countries.
-A possible BSEC Joint Task Force should be linked with the maritime security project envisaged above.
c) Border Defense: -Using the Border Defense Initiative (BDI) as an instrument to: Establish strong export and border control systems able to detect and combat WMD proliferation;
Consolidate national legal framework for countering WMD proliferation;
Fostering information exchange in the field of counter-proliferation and counterterrorism. d) Civil emergency planning: -Further development of the Black Sea Initiative for civil defense, which can help establish common procedures and mechanisms of civil emergency planning in order to facilitate our cooperation and rapid response to such situations in the Black See area, in a complementary manner with Blackseafor and BSEC. The value and effectiveness of EADRCC experience in this field should be further exploited in the benefit of this initiative.
--Security sector reform (making full use of the PtP instruments):
-Providing assistance to the Black Sea Partner states which have launched or affirmed intention to launch an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia);
-Encouraging R. Moldova to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO;
-Exploring the possibility to establish a Black Sea Partnership Action Plan (PAP) focused on defense and security sector reform, as a contribution to PAP-DIB and in support of defense reforms in the regional Partner countries. Such a PAP can make use of existing expertise of the Black Sea allies and help coordinate and multiply bilateral assistance provided by NATO allies to the Partners in the region.
END TEXT OF OUTLINE
3. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest CROUC H