Let's look at the mechanism of decay

I hinted at the process in the comment section of the previous article, but let's take some time and deconstruct it thoroughly, shall we.

If a lord promises something to another lord and then fails to deliver, the only possible manner in which war might be avoided is to have the promising lord indemnify the promised lord for whatever damage the faithful might've incurred through his faith.

This much is not merely obvious, but can be readily observed from the vantage of the King's Court, and so the King's Bench is readily created : an inner ring of lords, trusted by the king, whose job it is to look at actual disputes, and issue the actual text of the process of avoiding war. Entirely optional, you understand me, "if war is to be avoided, then this is what's to be done".

That's what the common law system ever was, back when it worked : a witness institution, a sort of promissory accounting service for the king's benefit, so he may have his "what the fuck is wrong with these two ?!" questions answered rationally.

The niggers brought their usual tools to bear, and every peon found himself required to pretend to lordship. The obvious problem with peons pretending to lordship would be that they aren't lords. The important difference would be of agency (which is to say poverty) : it is meaningful to calculate what service one lord has to perform for another in token of some abstract, because lords are actually capable of service.

Peons however are notⁱ. With quotes :

It appears to me, therefore, that the defendants must perform their promise, and, if they have been so unwary as to expose themselves to a great many actions, so much the worse for them.

This comes from Lord Justice Lindley's summation of the oldest and most celebrated case of torts : that involving the Carbolic Smoke Ball company. Then Bowen :

But it was said there was no check on the part of the persons who issued the advertisement, and that it would be an insensate thing to promise 100l. to a person who used the smoke ball unless you could check or superintend his manner of using it. The answer to that argument seems to me to be that if a person chooses to make extravagant promises of this kind he probably does so because it pays him to make them, and, if he has made them, the extravagance of the promises is no reason in law why he should not be bound by them.

You realise immediately what the problem is : the peon, unable to satisfy his obligations, defaults. Upon whom ? Well... the state changes natureⁱⁱ under this pressure, it becomes the satisfier of last resort of all the judgements against all the peasantry idly hallucinated into lordship. It has to grow big, and it has to take over currency, and everything else, because otherwise how is the pretense to be sustained ?

Well... obviously the peons start believing themselves to be lords. After all, it works (in the usual sense peons give the term), so maybe they really are lords ?

Maybe they could actually make promises ?

Of a very different sort, of course, than the sorts of promises lords make. Lords expect to live up to them ; peons expect the state to do it for them.

And here we are : the mobile "revolution", or what consumers have come to expect. Any questions ?

1. Yes, I'm aware that you flatter yourself (wholly unsubstantially) with all sorts of "self-ownership" delusions. Nevertheless, the peon does not own himself. He is owned, as a mere instrument, as trims to the land, and consequently he has nothing he can offer in any exchange, to anyone.

   The "kids who are interested in a topic" don't have anything to offer in some kind of "trade". They're just properties of the topic, when I go on dating site I pick up whatever girls were there ; when I order physics or cooking or whatever else I assume whatever "practitioners" existed "prior". Like objects, in either case, like you take the furniture with the house or the fleas with the dog. [↩]

2. No, government-alligned corporations aren't "private", duh. [↩]