Wikileaks - MXXX

Sunday, 04 September, Year 3 d.Tr. | Author: Mircea Popescu

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 TAGS: MARR, MOPS, NATO, PREL SUBJECT: NATO'S BUCHAREST SUMMIT DECLARATION, CABLE 2 OF 2

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) Due to the length of the communique, this is cable 2 of 2.

2. (C) SUMMARY, repeated from Cable 1 of 2: As reflected in the Bucharest Declaration (see para 3), the April 3-4 NATO Summit in Bucharest advanced U.S. policy objectives on a variety of fronts. NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their strong support for missions in Afghanistan (para 6), Kosovo (para 7, 8, 9), and Iraq (para 17). On missile defense (para 37, 38), Allies agreed the missile threat to NATO territory and populations is increasing, recognized the contribution to the protection of Allies the U.S. third sites will play and tasked the Council to develop options for a comprehensive missile defense architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not covered by the U.S. system (para 37, 38). They also agreed to invite Albania and Croatia (para 2, 19) to begin NATO accession talks, although Greece prevented a similar invitation to Macedonia until their bilateral dispute over Macedonia's name is resolved (para 20). While Allies delayed a decision to move Ukraine and Georgia into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process, Allies more importantly agreed that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members (para 23). The question is now "when," not "if" and MAP could come as early as NATO's December Foreign Ministerial (para 23). Bosnia and Montenegro were invited to begin an Intensified Dialogue with the Alliance on membership questions and relevant reforms (para 25) ) the first step on the membership ladder ) while the door was also left open for Serbia should it choose to move closer to NATO in the future (para 26). On the partnership front, Allies welcomed Malta back into Partnership for Peace (para 32), and NATO eliminated the term "contact countries" in favor of "partners across the globe" (para 35). The Alliance and ISAF nations issued a separate Vision Statement on Afghanistan (septel). END SUMMARY.

3. (U) BUCHAREST SUMMIT DECLARATION, continued:

25. We welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina's and Montenegro's decisions to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. We look forward to ambitious and substantive Action Plans which will further the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of these countries and we pledge our assistance to their respective reform efforts towards this goal. To help foster and guide these efforts, we have decided to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to begin an Intensified Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to their aspirations to membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision.

26. We stand ready to further develop an ambitious and substantive relationship with Serbia, making full use of its Partnership for Peace membership, and with a view to making more progress towards Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. We reiterate our willingness to deepen our cooperation with Serbia, in particular through developing an IPAP, and we will consider an Intensified Dialogue following a request by Serbia.

27. We expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and will closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard.

28. We recall that the NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism. Looking back at a history of more than a decade, we have developed a political dialogue as well as concrete projects in a broad range of international security issues where we have common goals and interests. While we are concerned by recent Russian statements and actions on key security issues of mutual concern, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), we stand ready to continue working with Russia as equal partners in areas of common concern, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration and the Founding Act. We should continue our common efforts in the fight against terrorism and in the area of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We urge Russia to engage actively in important cooperative offers that have been extended. We believe that United States-Russia bilateral discussions on missile defence and CFE, among other issues, can make an important contribution in this field. We believe the potential of the NATO-Russia Council is not fully realised and we remain ready to identify and pursue opportunities for joint actions at 27, while recalling the principle of independence of decision-making and actions by NATO or Russia. We reaffirm to Russia that NATO's Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.

29. We note Russia's ratification of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, and hope that it will facilitate further practical cooperation. We appreciate Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian territory. We would welcome deepened NATO-Russia cooperation in support of, and agreed by, the Government of Afghanistan, and look forward to building on the solid work already achieved in training Afghan and Central Asian counter-narcotics officers. Our continued cooperation under our Cooperative Airspace Initiative and Russia's support to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean contribute to our common fight against terrorism. We also welcome our cooperation on military interoperability, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency planning.

30. We reaffirm that NATO's policy of outreach through partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is an essential part of the Alliance's purpose and tasks. The Alliance's partnerships across the globe have an enduring value, contributing to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. With this in mind, we welcome progress made since our last Summit in Riga in strengthening NATO's policy of partnerships and cooperation, and reaffirm our commitment to undertake further efforts in this regard.

31. We value highly the contributions that our partners are making to NATO's missions and operations. Seventeen nations outside the Alliance are contributing forces to our operations and missions and many others provide different forms of support. We will continue to strive to promote greater interoperability between our forces and those of partner nations; to further enhance information-sharing and consultations with nations contributing to NATO-led operations; and to offer partner countries NATO's advice on, and assistance with, the defence- and security-related aspects of reform.

32. We welcome our Euro-Atlantic Partners at the Bucharest Summit and reiterate the enduring value of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. We remain committed to substantive political discussions and effective cooperation within these frameworks. We welcome Malta's return to the PfP and look forward to its active engagement in the EAPC. We welcome the strengthening of political dialogue through the EAPC Security Forum. We will give priority to several new practical initiatives, which include building integrity in defence institutions and the important role of women in conflict resolution as outlined in UNSCR 1325. We value the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre's successes over the past ten years in coordinating NATO and partner countries' contributions to disaster relief. We will continue to make full use of the NATO/PfP Trust Funds and of their opening to other partner countries. We welcome and will continue to support the engagement of all interested Partners across the Euro-Atlantic area in programmes to support defence and broader reforms, including the Individual Partnership Action Plan. Recalling our Istanbul Summit decision, we are committed to engage our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in these regions, and will continue dialogue with our Central Asian Partners on Afghanistan. We appreciate the significant contributions provided by our EAPC Partners to Alliance operations and look forward to working with them to address the security challenges of the 21st century.

33. We are pleased to note the significant progress achieved in the framework of our Mediterranean Dialogue since the Istanbul and Riga Summits. Political consultations with our Mediterranean Dialogue partners have gained both in frequency and substance, and the meeting held between our Foreign Ministers and their seven Mediterranean Dialogue partners last December contributed to a further deepening of our partnership. We therefore plan to pursue this momentum through deepening our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with the region. Our practical cooperation has grown in several areas, and new opportunities have been created especially in training and education. We welcome the progress made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were successfully conducted. We encourage our Mediterranean Dialogue partners to work with us to develop this Initiative further. The conclusion of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) with Egypt and Israel will help in establishing long-term, structured and effective cooperation with those countries. We encourage our other Mediterranean Dialogue partners to develop their own ICP in the near future. We welcome the implementation of the first ever Mediterranean Dialogue Trust Fund project to assist Jordan with the disposal of unexploded ordnance and ammunitions, and the launching of the feasibility study for the Trust Fund project to assist Mauritania with the disposal of ammunitions. We thank our Mediterranean Dialogue partners for their various contributions to our operations and missions.

34. We welcome the response of four countries in the Gulf region to our offer of cooperation in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and encourage other countries of the region to take up that offer. To that end, we plan to develop our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary basis, with this region. We are pleased to see their increased interest and participation in NATO training and education activities, and stand ready to enhance our cooperation in this and other fields. We welcome the progress made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were successfully conducted. We encourage our ICI partners to work with us to develop this Initiative further. We encourage our ICI partners to develop an ICP with a view to better structuring our cooperation. We very much appreciate the support provided by our ICI partners to Alliance operations and missions.

35. The Alliance places a high value on its expanding and varied relationships with other partners across the globe. Our objectives in these relationships include support for operations, security cooperation, and enhanced common understanding to advance shared security interests and democratic values. We have made substantial progress in building political dialogue and developing individual Tailored Cooperation Packages with a number of these countries. We particularly welcome the significant contribution by Australa, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore to NATO-led fforts in Afghanistan. We also welcome the valuale contributions by the Republic of Korea to efforts which support the NATO-led mission in Afghanistn. Recognising that each of these countries wishs to pursue a unique degree of relations with NAO, and that other countries may wish to pursue dalogue and cooperation with NATO as well, we reiterate our willingness to further develop existing and openness to new, individual relationships, ubject to the approval of the North Atlantic Councl, and at a pace that respects mutual interests n so doing.

36. We reaffirm the continued importnce of the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic seurity. In this regard, we welcome the progress i consolidation of regional ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance will continue to support, as appropriate, these efforts guided by regional priorities and based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness, in order to develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.

37. Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, trritory and populations. Missile defence forms prt of a broader response to counter this threat.We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.

38. We also commend the work already underway to strengthen NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns. We encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.

39. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to make an important contribution to peace, security, and stability and, in this regard, to preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We took note of the report prepared for us on raising NATO's profile in this field. As part of a broader response to security issues, NATO should continue contributing to international efforts in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and we task the Council in Permanent Session to keep these issues under active review.

40. The Alliance has reduced both its conventional forces significantly from Cold War levels and has reduced nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by over 90 percent. Allies have also reduced their nuclear arsenals. France has reduced the types of its nuclear systems to two, the number of its nuclear delivery vehicles by over half, and has announced it will reduce the number of its nuclear warheads to fewer than 300, with no other weapons beside those in its operational stockpile. The United Kingdom has reduced to one nuclear system, and has reduced the explosive power of its nuclear stockpile by 75 percent, and its number of operationally available nuclear warheads to fewer than 160. The United States has reduced its nuclear weapon stockpile to less than 25 percent of its size at the height of the Cold War, and decreased tactical nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by nearly 90 percent.

41. We remain deeply concerned about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We call on Iran to fully comply with UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803. We are also deeply concerned by the proliferation activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and call on it to fully comply with UNSCR 1718. Allies reaffirm their support for existing multi-lateral non-proliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and call for universal compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and full compliance with UNSCR 1540. Allies agree to redouble their efforts to fully implement the non-proliferation agreements and relevant UNSCRs to which Allies reaffirm their support and by which they are bound.

42. We fully endorse the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 28 March 2008 and reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to the CFE Treaty Regime, as expressed in the Alliance's position contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna and Alliance statements reflecting subsequent developments. We place the highest value on the CFE Treaty regime with all its elements and underscore the strategic importance of the CFE Treaty, including its flank regime, as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic Security. We are deeply concerned that the Russian Federation has continued its unilateral "suspension" of its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. This action does not contribute to our common objective of preserving the long-term viability of the CFE regime and we urge the Russian Federation to resume its implementation. The current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely. We have offered a set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for parallel actions on key issues, including steps by NATO Allies on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and by the Russian Federation on outstanding commitments related to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We believe these proposals address all of Russia's stated concerns. We encourage Russian authorities to work cooperatively with us and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so that together we can preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.

43. We are concerned with the persistence of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles.

44. We have already done much to transform our forces and capabilities in line with our political objectives, in particular the priorities laid out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, and our operational experience. We will continue this process to ensure the Alliance remains able to meet its operational commitments and perform the full range of its missions. Our operations highlight the need to develop and field modern, interoperable, flexible and sustainable forces. These forces must be able to conduct, upon decision by the Council, collective defence and crisis response operations on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance, with little or no host nation support. We will also ensure that we have the right kind of capabilities to meet the evolving security challenges of the 21st century, and to do so, we will transform, adapt and reform as necessary.

45. Transformation is a continual process and demands constant and active attention. We therefore support our Defence Ministers' efforts as they oversee the management of the defence aspects of transformation to ensure NATO remains effective and efficient, especially by pursuing ongoing efforts in the following areas:

-- We must ensure that we provide the forces required for our operations and other commitments. To that end we will continue efforts to be able to deploy and sustain more forces. We are committed to support the NATO Response Force by providing the necessary forces, and to improving the availability of operational and strategic reserve forces for our operations. We will seek greater domestic support for our operations, including through improved public diplomacy efforts.

-- We will further develop the capabilities required to conduct the full range of our missions and to remedy specific shortfalls. We will work particularly at improving strategic lift and intra-theatre airlift, especially mission-capable helicopters and welcome national initiatives in support of this work, as well as addressing multinational logistics. We will further strengthen information superiority through networked capabilities, including an integrated air command and control system; increased maritime situational awareness; and timely delivery of the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability. We will continue to enhance the capability and interoperability of our special operations forces. Supported by the defence planning processes, we will enhance our efforts to develop and field the right capabilities and forces, with the greatest practicable interoperability and standardisation. This will be furthered by improving trans-Atlantic defence industrial cooperation.

-- We are committed to develop policies and capabilities to deal with emerging challenges and threats. This includes the development of a comprehensive policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.

-- We are pursuing the adaptation and reform of the Alliance's structures and processes. In this context we are reviewing the peacetime establishment of the NATO Command Structure to make it leaner, more effective and efficient, and reforming defence planning processes in order to promote timely delivery of the capabilities sought by the Comprehensive Political Guidance.

46. Transformation is not possible without sufficient, properly prioritised resources. We are committed to continuing to provide, individually and collectively, the resources necessary for our Alliance to perform the tasks we demand from it. Therefore we encourage nations whose defence spending is declining to halt that decline and to aim to increase defence spending in real terms.

47. NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information systems against cyber attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy on Cyber Defence, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on Cyber Defence emphasises the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. We look forward to continuing the development of NATO's cyber defence capabilities and strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities.

48. We have noted a report "NATO's Role in Energy Security", prepared in response to the tasking of the Riga Summit. Allies have identified principles which will govern NATO's approach in this field, and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO's endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organisations that are specialised in energy security. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for our consideration at the 2009 Summit.

49. Demands on our Alliance have grown in complexity in the last twenty years, as the security environment has changed and both the scope of our missions and operations and our membership have expanded. This requires continual adaptation and reform of NATO Headquarters' structures and processes. We note the progress that has been made in this field, as part of NATO's overall transformation; but more remains to be done, including to get full benefit from our move to a new Headquarters building. In evaluating where we need to change, we need to make fuller use of lessons drawn from our experience in delivering our core functions, including meeting operational, capability development, partnership and strategic communications requirements. Building on our Defence Ministers' work to take forward the defence aspects of transformation, Allies will also need to consider how to achieve the fastest and most coherent flow of sound political, military and resource advice to support our consensual decision-making, and to enhance our responsiveness to time-sensitive operational needs, including those of NATO Commanders. We have requested the Secretary General to chart a path forward, in time for the 2009 Summit, on how to meet these objectives.

50. We express our sincere appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Romania. The city of Bucharest has been the venue of NATO's largest ever Summit meeting, highlighting the Alliance's determination to work closely with the International Community as well as its own unique contribution to promoting security and stability in a fast-changing strategic environment. At our meeting we have taken decisions and given further direction for NATO's own ongoing adaptation to that environment, through its missions and operations, the modernisation of its structures and capabilities, closer engagement of other nations and organisations, as well as its continuing openness to the inclusion of additional member states. We have strengthened our dialogue and cooperation with countries and organisations vital to our security. We will meet again next year in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate NATO's 60th anniversary, take stock of its adaptation, and give further direction for the modernisation of our Alliance to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. NULAND

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12 Responses

  1. M___ urmat de 3 litere cu XXX

    interesant.

  2. Mircea Popescu`s avatar
    2
    Mircea Popescu 
    Sunday, 4 September 2011

    Simti ca ghicesti cuvintul ?

  3. HAHA genial!

  4. Ce facem aici, jucăm mimă?

  5. Cine se scoala de dimineata, _______ devreme.

  6. F U T E ?

  7. Casca devreme, nerusinatule, la iti era mintea? Arzatear satana.

  8. Mircea Popescu`s avatar
    8
    Mircea Popescu 
    Monday, 5 September 2011

    @Cristian Auzi, tu ai incercat din criptograme apropo ?

    @Juice Io ma scol sculat cam in toata dimineata si nu casc. Ci casca iele. Your theory fails.

  9. @Mircea Popescu: le-am zărit, dar am oroare de jocurile logice și chestii de genul ăsta.

    @Fuck de white man is a cultural artistical expression: poate-s membru MISA și atunci fututul matinal e permis, ba chiar încurajat.

  10. Mircea Popescu`s avatar
    10
    Mircea Popescu 
    Monday, 5 September 2011

    Hm. Psihanalizabil ?

  11. Cristian`s avatar
    11
    Cristianinsigna de trolinsigna de tehnologinsigna pentru 1000 de comentarii 
    Monday, 5 September 2011

    N-am vreo mare explicație pentru asta. Poate lipsa de pricepere (zi-i prostie dacă vrei) combinată cu lenea.

  12. la aia e pisarea doar.

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