90216 12/20/2006 6:46 06SARAJEVO3203 Embassy Sarajevo SECRET 06SARAJEVO2752 VZCZCXRO9570 OO RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHVJ #3203/01 3540646 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 200646Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5074 INFO RUCNMEN/EU MEMBER STATES RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0311 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0038 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0216 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0032 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0096 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0278 RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 003203
STATE FOR EUR DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, KAWC, BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - HIGH REP PRESSES FOR "REAL ASSESSMENT" ON OHR CLOSURE AT FEBRUARY 2007 PIC
REF: SARAJEVO 2752
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: Prior to the December 6-7 meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Brussels, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rosemary DiCarlo meeting with High Representative (HighRep) Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Schwarz-Schilling urged the U.S. to support a "real review" about OHR's future at the February 2007 PIC and outlined two contingency plans for keeping OHR open. He told DiCarlo that ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla DelPonte had approach him about using his Bonn Powers to remove the Republika Spska (RS) Minister of Interior, if PIFWC Stojan Zupljanin were not arrested in 30 days. On police reform, Schwarz-Schilling cautioned that it was too early to bring police reform negotiations to a head. Finally, Schwarz-Schilling proposed establishing in January a secretariat to manage a second phase of constitutional reform. END SUMMARY
A "Real Review" Before OHR Closes
2. (C) Schwarz-Schilling opened the meeting by making a plea for a "real review" about OHR's future when the PIC meets in February 2007. Some countries see closure in June 2007 as already decided and the February review as a formality, he explained. As HighRep he had a responsibility to ensure the February 2007 PIC did more than act as "a rubberstamp," Schwarz-Schilling said. OHR would distribute its own assessment 10 days prior to the February 2007 PIC, which he said would provide the basis for discussion. The assessment would examine regional factors, particularly Kosovo, security in Bosnia, and "internal dynamics," such as the functionality of state institutions and the political situation. OHR's future should not hinge on the status of one or two reforms, but a "holistic, systematic view of the stability of Bosnia," he added.
3. (C) Though the PIC would not decide OHR's fate at the December meeting, it would still need to discuss alternative options for maintaining an OHR presence in Sarajevo, Schwarz-Schilling said. The HighRep told DiCarlo that OHR staff had outlined two options for keeping OHR open. The first was a straight forward 12 month delay with OHR continuing to operate at whatever staff level existed on March 1, 2007 while parallel steps were taken for a gradual build-up of a reinforced Office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR). The second involved continuing the transition to a reinforced EUSR, while the EUSR retained his separate position as HighRep and the Bonn Powers. He would be supported by a small "Bonn Powers team."
4. (C) DiCarlo agreed that no decision on OHR's future should be taken prior to February 2007. The U.S. supported a thorough assessment at that time, but hoped to be in a position to close OHR on schedule in June. In the United States' view, OHR needed to focus on creating the conditions required that would allow OHR to close. With regard to the two options for keeping OHR open, DiCarlo stressed that the U.S. could not support maintaining a small Bonn Powers office in a dual-hatted reinforced EUSR/OHR. If an extension were required, the U.S. preference would likely be to keep OHR as it is in March. DiCarlo added that the OHR assessment should not add new benchmarks for closure. The current benchmarks, spelled out in OHR's Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) were clear and what the PIC had decided OHR needed to accomplish to complete its mandate.
ICTY - The Metric Remains "Full Cooperation"
5. (C) Turning the ICTY, DiCarlo expressed concern that ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla DelPonte was "raising the bar" on SAA conditionality for the Bosnians. DelPonte had often failed to make clear to the Bosnians precisely what type of cooperation she required from them or what kind of support
SARAJEVO 00003203 002 OF 002
she required from the international community. Schwarz-Schilling agreed, adding that DelPonte often made claims about the whereabouts and travels of war criminals without backing them up. This approach had frustrated the Bosnians and undercut her credibility with them, he said. Schwarz-Schilling said he had told DelPonte that OHR could not support her work based on unsubstantiated assertions.
6. (S) DelPonte told him that she believed RS Minister of Interior Cadjo know the whereabouts of ICTY indictee Stojan Zupljanin, Schwarz-Schilling continued; and she informed the HighRep that she had given Cadjo an ultimatum to arrest Zupljanin and transfer him to The Hague within 30 days. If Cadjo failed to deliver, DelPonte wanted him to use his Bonn Powers to remove Cadjo from office, Schwarz-Schilling said. Aspects of DelPonte's case against Cadjo appeared credible, but he needed evidence. He was prepared to use his Bonn Powers, but only if he could verify the information Del Ponte presented him.
7. (C) Schwarz-Schilling told DiCarlo that he expected the Police Directorate to issue its final report on December 20. Until then, he was not prepared "to force the issue," he said, adding forcing it too early risked causing RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik to walk out of political talks. Schwarz-Schilling's Principal Deputy Larry Butler noted that Dodik had not agreed to transfer budgetary competencies for the police from the entity to the State. This and transfer of legislative competencies were critical to a police reform deal. Otherwise, there was "plenty of room" within the three EC principles on police reform for the RS to maintain its police force. Butler also warned that if Dodik acted on his threat to submit the Police Directorate report to the RS National Assembly (RSNA) and the RSNA voted against it, it would make it even harder for Dodik to reach a compromise on police reform. Dodik's threat to hold a referendum on police reform would have even more dire consequences, Butler continued, as a police reform referendum could become a surrogate for a referendum on RS independence.
8. (C) Turning to constitutional reform, Schwarz-Schilling stressed his continued support for the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments, but admitted that he was not optimistic about its prospects. It was important to maintain the momentum on constitutional reform and signal to Bosnia that a second phase would take place. With this he in mind he proposed establishing a "Constitutional Reform Secretariat" within the Bosnian parliament in January.
SIPDIS Taking this step would not require abandoning the U.S.-brokered package, he quickly added, as OHR could frame the secretariat as intended to support both phases of constitutional reform. He asked whether the U.S. would provide USD 1 million to support the secretariat's work and said that he requested the same amount of money from the EC.
9. (C) DiCarlo thanked the HighRep for his support for the U.S.-brokered package, but suggested it was too soon to make any definitive judgments about its prospects. This would have to wait until a new government was in place. In the meantime, the U.S. would not support taking any steps, including establishing a "Constitutional Reform Secretariat," that might provide Bosnian political leaders with an excuse to walk away from the constitutional compromises they reached in March. Finally, DiCarlo urged Schwarz-Schilling to refrain from publi discussion about plans for a second phase of constitutional reform which would undermine prospects of passing the existing amendment package. MCELHANEY