78462 9/14/2006 16:23 06BUCHAREST1451 Embassy Bucharest CONFIDENTIAL 06PRAGUE1100 VZCZCXRO3428 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBM #1451 2571623 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 141623Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5175 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 001451
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ICTY, SR, YI, RO SUBJECT: ROMANIAN VIEWS ON SERBIA, ICTY AND PFP
REF: A. PRAGUE 1100
B. SECSTATE 146343
Classified By: Charge d' Affairs, Mark A Taplin Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
1. (C) In discussions of reftel demarche at the MFA and conversations with both MFA and MOD officials around the margins of a recent V-10 informal defense officials gathering, Romanian officials took our comments on board but also expressed some concern about the diplomatic pressure currently being placed on Belgrade. Contacts opined that the Serbs were unlikely to bow to western pressure and argued that sending Mladic to The Hague might provide a new rallying point for Serbian ultra-nationalists who could steer Serbian elections away from Euro-Atlantic goals.
2. (C) Romanian officials also evinced hope that ICTY conditionality could be back-loaded onto the MAP process rather than as a condition for PfP entrance. MFA NATO Director Maghiar and Presidential National Security Counselor Degeratu said such a move might give Belgrade a chance to take more ambitious steps forward. State Secretary Dobritoiu on the margins of the V-10 meeting, surrounded by various civilian and uniformed department heads, told Polmiloff that there was unanimity among Romanians that Serbia might become further isolated in Europe. This could occur, he went on, not because of a lack of will, but rather due to accelerated push to resolve the Kosovo problem by the end of the. They assured us that in their conversations with their Serbian counterparts, they will press for ICTY compliance and the importance of handing Mladic to The Hague. Our Romanian interlocutors acknowledged that Serbian stubbornness and pride were holding back Belgrade.
3. (C) Comments: The bottom line is that the Romanians appear to agree--however reluctantly--with our request to stress PIFWC conditionality in their conversations with Serbian counterparts. At the same time, they appear to be more focused on carrots than sticks in eliciting a change of Belgrade's behavior. We note with interest Embassy Prague,s report (Ref A), as the Romanians are reflecting similar enthusiasm for loosening PIFWC conditionality on PFP entry. Romania,s military has an extensive history with the Serbian military, and is open to closer collaboration. Romanian officials, for instance, have suggested that one carrot would be to allow a Serbian unit to join with a NATO ally or partner in an exercise or possibly a deployment. They said that they would be pleased to have the Serbs embedded with a Romanian unit, "in any place except Kosovo, of course." End Comment. Taplin