Wikileaks - MX
147547 3/27/2008 21:05 08STATE31896 Secretary of State UNCLASSIFIED 08STATE31896 VZCZCXRO6650 PP RUEHAST RUEHBW RUEHMJ DE RUEHC #1896/01 0872115 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 272105Z MAR 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0461 RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY PRIORITY 2213 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5383 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3593 RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 9333 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 9306 RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 8910 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2616 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 6975 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 6194 RUEHBD/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PRIORITY 7193 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0388 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3006 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 3803 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 2565 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 7317 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 9646 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 8620 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 3441 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 3531 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0692 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 8751 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 3150 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 8238 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 3458 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9097 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 8931 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0565 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 9807 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 3089 RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 3263 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 5747 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 5484 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 4825 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5985 RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA PRIORITY 9378 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 4532 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8240 RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO PRIORITY 6187 RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4245 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 5721 RUEHBE/AMEMBASSY BELMOPAN PRIORITY 1696 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 STATE 031896
SIPDIS
SIPDIS BERN ALSO FOR LIECHTENSTEIN
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN LONDON, UK (FEBRUARY 4-6, 2008)
SUMMARY
1. The sixteenth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting took place in London, UK on February 4-6, 2008. Immediately following the OEG on February 7, the UK Ministry of Defense hosted an outreach day with six invited countries from the Gulf/Levant region. Information contained in this cable is provided for Posts, information and is not to be passed to non-OEG participant governments. A follow-on cable septel will provide a non-paper to pass to host nation governments of all PSI-endorsing states to keep them abreast of developments in the PSI community.
BACKGROUND
2. Meeting Summary: UK hosted the sixteenth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in London on February 4-6, 2008. All twenty participants in the OEG attended (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States). Russia sent only a representative from its local embassy, claiming visa difficulties. The OEG focused on three main objectives: reviewing the first five years of PSI and identifying challenges for the future; outreach to non-OEG PSI partners; and enhancing the operational momentum of PSI. The agenda also included presentations and discussions on the 2005 SUA Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) amendment process, new national counterproliferation structures created to facilitate interministerial work within the Canadian government, a Germany-hosted PSI website, an update on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the U.S.-hosted PSI fifth anniversary event planned for May 28-29 in Washington. The OEG heard presentations from three invited industry organizations, including Lloyds Maritime Intelligence Unit, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and Hutchinson Ports (UK) Ltd. New Zealand distributed final copies of the PSI Model National Response Plan and countries were asked to describe their recent and planned outreach activities to non-OEG and non-PSI countries. Finally, delegations received an update on future PSI exercises. Break-out sessions were conducted on the legal, law enforcement, exercise and intelligence areas related to PSI. New this time, the UK
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organized the first ever joint legal/law enforcement breakout group. Items proposed by the U.S. included: a master PSI activities calendar to include exercises and outreach activities and the development of diverse unclassified PSI success stories for use at the PSI 5th Anniversary event in Washington, DC to be held May 28-29, 2008. For further detail, see Chairman's Statement in para (10).
3. Delegation: The U.S. delegation was led by Richard Douglas, OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats. The delegation included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy and General Counsel), the Department of State (ISN), the Joint Staff (J5 and Legal Counsel), U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U. S. Strategic Command, the Department of Homeland Security (Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
4. Introduction: Dr. Kim Howells, Minister of State of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, welcomed PSI Operational Experts to London on February 4, 2008. The OEG was chaired by Commodore Simon Williams of the UK MOD. Dr. Howells suggested three primary areas for the OEG to consider: identifying priorities for future work based on an analysis of the successes achieved to date; outreach to countries that support PSI but that do not participate in the OEG; and renewed operational and practical work.
5. The OEG Process - 5 Years On: A key objective of the London OEG was to assess the first five years of PSI. OEG participants discussed PSI successes and the challenges to address for the future. Presentations emphasized the notable growth of PSI - in the number of endorsing countries from 11 at the start of the Initiative to over 85 presently - and identified key challenges including how to grow inclusively, how to sustain PSI,s momentum and how to adapt to the changing proliferation threat. The ensuing discussion brought out a need to develop effective information strategies to various PSI audiences, including participants' own national governments, non-OEG PSI endorsing states, and media and the general public. Delegations were encouraged to develop a diverse set of unclassified PSI success stories to complement those information strategies.
6. Outreach: The second priority of the London OEG was to focus efforts on assisting non-OEG PSI partners' understanding of and capabilities to support PSI activities. Presentations offered specific suggestions that OEG countries
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could consider to maximize effectiveness of outreach activities. Several delegations noted the need to increase coordination of outreach activities. All countries made brief presentations on their recent and planned outreach activities.
7. Enhancing Operational Momentum: The final objective of the OEG was to retrain the OEG's focus on operational progress. In this vein, several topics were raised, including capacity-building and technical assistance, a password-protected website that Germany created, and improvements to national organization structures that facilitate whole-of-government support for PSI. Additionally, delegations heard updates on the 2005 Protocol to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) amendment process. The U.S. reminded delegations that the U.S. Executive Branch transmitted the 2005 SUA Protocols to the Senate in October 2007 and announced that the first briefing on the SUA Protocol to Senate staff was provided on January 23, 2008. It was well-received, and the Senate staff members expressed interest in receiving further information.
8. Turkey offered insights into some of the difficulty it experiences as the recipient of frequent requests for interdiction assistance, noting a need for more and better information and longer lead times for decision-making and options development. Turkey's intervention highlighted the perspectives of requested versus requesting parties in any interdiction case and the need for PSI partners to work together to devise mutually workable solutions.
9. The U.S. offered to do the following: (a) facilitate a virtual working group to coordinate outreach activities led by OEG countries; (b) collate responses to the legal non-paper on disposition and liability with a goal of creating a document that captures the OEG's understanding of the international and national laws that govern interdiction, disposition and liability; (c) host a conference and outreach event May 28-29, 2008 in Washington to commemorate the fifth anniversary of PSI; and (d) sponsor multi-day capacity-building workshops for non-OEG PSI partners.
10. Begin Chairman's Statement:
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM February 4-6, 2008
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1. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) met in London, United Kingdom from February 4th - 6th, 2008. Twenty OEG countries were present - Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Welcoming Remarks
2. DR Kim Howells, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, welcomed PSI Operational Experts to London. DR Howells stressed UK's commitment to countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials, and the key role that PSI plays in this work. He emphasized the importance that, after nearly five years of work, the Group should develop fresh ideas to take its work forward. DR Howells identified three areas in particular where he believed there was scope for continued and vitalized development: fresh priority work in the future based on an analysis of the successes achieved to date; outreach to countries who support PSI but who do not participate in the OEG; and renewed operational and practical work.
The OEG Process - 5 Years on
3. The Group reviewed the successes achieved by the OEG since it was launched in 2003, and the challenges and key priorities for the future. The UK and Greece gave overviews of what had been undertaken and achieved since the launch of the group, emphasizing the high-paced tempo it has adopted from the start, how the Group has acquired deeper understanding of the best ways to approach the multifaceted nature of interdiction work, and how it has broadened its activities to ensure comprehensive coverage of interdiction work. The OEG had also been active in capacity building (for example, the production of the Model National Plan - which Portugal offered to translate - and the WMD Handbook) and in adopting flexible working practices to respond to the dynamic evolution of the proliferation threat.
4. The US, New Zealand and Poland set out the challenges and key priorities for the future. The principal challenges were seen as maintaining the success of the initiative whilst stimulating its increasing membership, sustaining the momentum of work, and adapting to new developments in the proliferation threat; the key priorities were seen as being to regionalize and deepen outreach, to align the exercise programme with prioritized operational issues, to develop knowledge using new tools. Turkey stressed the importance of
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accurate and timely intelligence-sharing, as well as adherence to the principle of control at origin. The OEG needed to remain alert to any need to develop fresh avenues of work, for example in identifying the scope for new elements of international legislation and new policy initiatives; there was also a need to develop a comprehensive media and public relations strategy to ensure that PSI was better understood by opinion formers and the wider public.
5. During the discussion some countries proposed a range of ideas which might contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the PSI, for example Regional OEGs, working groups or a focal point.
Outreach
6. The United States and New Zealand gave presentations on the opportunities and challenges of outreach to non-OEG PSI endorsees. It was emphasized that the OEG operates on behalf of all endorsing States, and that the priorities for outreach to these endorsing States should be: to improve their knowledge and dispel the myths of PSI; to improve Partners, capacity to contribute effectively to PSI counter-proliferation efforts and interdictions, in particular in linking agencies across Government to handle and respond to requests for assistance. It was noted that it would be important to vary the type of capacity building offered to Partners, and to ensure that there were regular opportunities for dialogue, including through regionally-based outreach. Equally, it was recognized that outreach was resource-intensive and that OEG Participants should look to combine their outreach efforts. New Zealand circulated both hard and e-copies of the finalized PSI Model National Response Plan as well as a 10-page summary of it.
7. A number of OEG Participants briefed on their recent outreach activities. Poland briefed on the outreach undertaken as part of Exercise EASTERN SHIELD in 2007, and the seminars in the Black Sea and Gulf regions; further activity was being planned for 2008, including an exercise in Croatia. France briefed on Exercise GUISTIR, which took place in Djibouti, March 10-12 2008; this to include a seminar followed by a LIVEX, and its main aim would be outreach to Maghreb and Red Sea countries. Japan briefed on the outreach elements of Exercise PACIFIC SHIELD 07, which involved outreach to PSI Partners from Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, as well as to non-PSI endorsees; all parts of the exercise were fully open to all countries and the media, to allow a high level of discussion between those involved. Turkey briefed on Black Sea security, setting out a number of maritime security arrangements and initiatives in the region,
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including BLACKSEAFOR, Operation Black Sea Harmony, and Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea.
8. Australia briefed on its outreach activity in the Asia-Pacific region, highlighting the need to have a good understanding of individual non-OEG Partners' concerns. Table-top exercises were seen as good outreach vehicles, in particular because they demonstrate the need for an inter-agency approach. Equally, outreach on PSI should be set in the wider context of maritime security.
9 In a Tour de Table, other OEG Participants briefed on the outreach activities they had undertaken recently, and their future plans. A recurrent theme was the need to co-ordinate PSI outreach activity with broader export-control and counter-proliferation outreach activities.
Enhancing Operational Momentum
10. In this session, the UK introduced its thoughts on enhancing operational momentum through presentations on the lessons process and the experience of HM Revenue and Customs in PSI. The UK offered to "streamline" the lessons database. We need to make sure that in operationalising PSI we achieve the aims of deterring proliferators.
Capacity Building/Technical Assistance
11. Australia updated the Group on the progress made by ICAO on the proposal to create a new transport offense for the carriage of WMD and related materials by air. A draft text to support this proposal had been circulated, and was being considered by a special sub-committee in Montreal in February 2008. Australia asked states to discuss the text and consult with relevant national authorities, prior to the Montreal meeting. Outreach to the Air Transport industry, both internationally and nationally, was being considered. The UK gave a presentation on its experience of establishing a Competent Authority for obtaining Flag-State consent for at-sea boarding under the Protocol to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea, setting out the information a Competent Authority would need in order to come to rapid decisions on consent, and the parallels with the system already in place for granting boarding consent under counter-narcotics legislation.
National Organization
12. Canada provided an update on its national CP coordination structure, which had been instrumental in facilitating strong
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interagency coordination and cooperation on the full range of CP issues and activities. Turkey briefed on the establishment of a national Naval CBRN detection team, which would be used to augment maritime boarding teams. Singapore briefed on the changes to their Strategic Goods (Control) Act which come into effect in January 2008, to allow all items controlled under the four international export control regimes to be covered in its national legislation; outreach to Singaporean industry had been conducted as part of the programme of implementation of these amendments.
Classified OEG website
13. Germany briefed on the development of a classified PSI website, which would provide access to a full range of PSI tools, including OEG points of contact, a master event list, OEG Chairman's statements, PSI Law Library, the PSI Model Response Plan, and the Exercise Lessons Learned.
Updates
14. The UK updated the Group on the work being undertaken by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Proliferation Finance. Work was being undertaken to develop a typology for Proliferation Finance, which was due to be finalized in June 2008; this would form the starting point for future guidance. In the longer term, FATF would undertake work on broad-based prohibitions, which would be informed by the conclusion of the work on typologies. Furthermore, the Plenary meeting of FATF in February 2008 would discuss adding Proliferation Finance to the Task Force's regular mandate.
Break-Out Group Reports
OEG Legal Breakout Session.
15. Presentations were given by:
-- Greece on the implementation of the SUA Protocols in the Greek legal system.
-- Japan on domestic legal issues highlighted by their Pacific Shield exercise.
-- Australia on air transport offenses in relation to possible amendments to the Montreal Convention which would be discussed further in ICAO in two weeks' time.
-- The US on the overflight consent matrix; its domestic implementation of the 2005 SUA protocols and Law of the Sea Convention; the PSI Law Library; its non-paper on
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interdiction, disposition and liability; and its views on liability incurred during maritime interdictions.
-- The UK on the Super gun case.
-- The Greek presentation on the implementation of the SUA Protocols generated lively discussion on its liability provisions in article 8bis(10)(b). A number of countries explained that liability issues still remained for them.
16. It was agreed that the US non paper on the International Legal Framework for Interdiction, Disposition and Liability circulated at the Rhodes OEG provided a useful framework for PSI partners to set forth domestic considerations they may have with regard to interdiction, disposition, and liability. The US agreed to collate any responses with a goal of creating a document that captures the OEG's understanding of the international and national law that governs interdiction, disposition and liability.
OEG Law Enforcement Breakout Session
17. Presentation on a new type of procurement network from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. OEG law enforcement group learned about a new type of procurement method using Internet mail forwarding companies, originally set up for legitimate purposes, that use virtual offices for reshipping schemes to enable proliferators to evade export controls. Proliferators can place orders for controlled items manufactured in the US and arrange for shipment to the US mailing address for the virtual office. Goods are photographed and placed on a password protected website enabling the proliferators or foreign clients to view the items in the first instance. Goods are then shipped to overseas addresses evading export controls and foreign import restrictions. To date, this system has identified goods such as missile & electronic components & conventional firearms procured using this system. A variation on this scheme has been identified whereby the virtual office clones a manufacturer's website and adds its own company name as a legitimate distributor for the manufacturer's goods. When the manufacturer "googles" and checks the company name it will come up as a legitimate distributor for type of goods concerned - due to the cloned website.
18. Presentation on the UKs UNSCR Enforcement Plan.
-- UK's presentation focused on 3 specific areas: 1) the development of an Iran action plan 2) risk profiling and 3) the identification of high risk dual use goods for export.
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-- The action plan was developed to ensure implementation of UNSCRs and at the same time assess HMRC's current activity and capability in this area. The plan involved the development of a risk picture using a systematic method of capturing information on entities dealing and exporting high risk goods to Iran and known diversionary countries from a variety of different sources. A list of UK companies was formulated & risk assessed for visits by compliance officers - focusing on non compliance with export controls (e.g. lack of understanding through ignorance) to deliberate attempts to evade controls. Work is still ongoing and results are yet to be assessed but the plan has placed a greater UK compliance focus and tightening of controls on goods exported to Iran.
-- Complementing the compliance plan, UK discussed the conduct of an exercise last year focusing on 2 key risk areas : 1) aircraft parts to Iran 2) selected CN Commodity Codes on the EU dual use list correlation table. Automated risk profiling was used and results were encouraging; over 200 consignments were inspected and 8% of these warranted further investigation.
19. The group discussed pros and cons of automated profiling noting in particular the importance of officers' own initiative when profiling. Automation was no substitute for this. Also, it cannot target goods in transit nor does it allow for the checking of all relevant documentation concerning the movement of goods. On the positive side it allowed for new risks and profile changes to be made quickly -- 4. (C) According to local media, the kidnapping of Tahseen Sheikhly at his home in the Shia-majority neighborhood of Amin in 9 Nissan district took place at approximately three p.m. when kidnappers driving Ministry of Interior (MoI) vehicles and dressed as IP commandos seized him and killed an unknown number of bodyguards. Sheikhly, a Sunni, has served as the public face of the Baghdad Security Plan for approximately six months as the lead civilian spokesman for Fard Al Qanoon (the Baghdad Security Plan). Sheikhly recently began to serve as the spokesman for the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR).
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WHO IS FIGHTING WHOM IN BAGHDAD?
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5. (C) Most local contacts view the current conflagration as an extension of the broader feud between the Sadrist Trend and ISCI/Badr. Reports from across the city indicate that the majority of residents are remaining at home in order to avoid what they fear will be increasing levels of violence. Post notes, however, that Friday mosque sermons may play an important role in either escalating or dampening the violence in Baghdad. CROCKER
