Wikileaks - MLXXXI

157982 6/12/2008 20:15 08STATE63666 Secretary of State CONFIDENTIAL 08STATE42285|08STATE54671|08UNVIE243 R 122015Z JUN 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY ACCRA AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT AMEMBASSY ASTANA AMEMBASSY ASUNCION AMEMBASSY BAKU AMEMBASSY BAMAKO AMEMBASSY BANJUL AMEMBASSY BELGRADE AMEMBASSY BOGOTA AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY CHISINAU AMEMBASSY COLOMBO AMEMBASSY CONAKRY AMEMBASSY COTONOU AMEMBASSY DAKAR AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE AMEMBASSY FREETOWN AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY KAMPALA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE AMEMBASSY LILONGWE AMEMBASSY LIMA AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA AMEMBASSY MANAGUA AMEMBASSY MANILA AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA AMEMBASSY NIAMEY AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU AMEMBASSY PANAMA AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY RIGA AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO AMEMBASSY SKOPJE AMEMBASSY TALLINN AMEMBASSY TASHKENT AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA AMEMBASSY TIRANA AMEMBASSY TUNIS AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR AMEMBASSY VALLETTA AMEMBASSY VILNIUS AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE AMEMBASSY YEREVAN AMEMBASSY ZAGREB AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI USMISSION USUN NEW YORK C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 063666

UNVIE FOR S. AMADEO E. SANDBERG T. OSTOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2033 TAGS: PARM, MTCRE, PREL, MNUC, KSCA, ETTC, KNNP, TSPA

SUBJECT: HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION (HCOC) -- RESULTS OF THE SEVENTH REGULAR MEETING OF SUBSCRIBING STATES, MAY 29-30, 2008 (SBU)

REF: A. STATE 54671 B. STATE 42285 C. UNVIE 243

Classified By: IO/T Acting Director Dennis Delehanty. Reason: 1.4. H.

1. (U) The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) held its Seventh Regular Meeting of Subscribing States on May 29-30, 2008, at the Vienna International Center (VIC), in Vienna, Austria. 75 of 130 Subscribing States registered for the meeting. Many Subscribing States were represented by their UN missions in Vienna. Ambassador Gyorgyi Martin Zanathy, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations, IAEA, CTBTO, and UNIDO in Vienna, chaired the meeting.

//////////////////////////// Report of the Outgoing Chair ////////////////////////////

2. (C) Outgoing HCOC Chair Ivica Dronjic, Alternate Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, IAEA, CTBTO, and UNIDO in Vienna, reiterated the importance of the HCOC as the only global instrument in the area of ballistic missile proliferation and underscored the achievements of the HCOC in the past year - four new countries joined the HCOC, the number of Annual Declarations (ADs) increased, and the successful organization of an outreach seminar for countries in the Middle East. He urged all Subscribing States to diligently implement their commitments under the HCOC, noting that its role and importance in addressing ballistic missile proliferation will be a direct reflection of their willingness to vigorously implement the Code. Finally, he hoped that the two HCOC countries that possess the most missile capabilities (e.g. Russia and the United States) would resolve the Prelaunch Notification (PLN) issue as soon as possible and begin (U.S.) or resume (Russia) issuing HCOC PLNs.

///////////////////////////// Remarks by the Incoming Chair /////////////////////////////

3. (C) Newly-elected HCOC Chair Ambassador Martin Zanathy pledged her commitment to upholding the principles of the HCOC and working for its full implementation and universalization. She said Hungary believes effective multilateralism is the cornerstone of the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems and looks forward to working with HCOC Subscribing States on outreach and other activities to realize their shared nonproliferation objectives.

///////////////////////////////////////////// Report of the Executive Secretariat/Immediate Central Contact (ES/ICC) /////////////////////////////////////////////

4. (C) The Austrian Executive Secretariat/Immediate Central Contact(ES/ICC) reported that four countries -- the Dominican Republic, San Marino, Maldives, and Samoa -- had subscribed to the HCOC since the 2007 annual meeting, bringing the current membership to 130. The ES/ICC also reported that the domain name of the HCOC public website had been changed to www.hcoc.at. In addition, the ES/ICC noted that it had continued to disseminate ADs and PLNs and had circulated a revised annual declaration form for "Nil reports" to further facilitate the submission of ADs. It also had updated the HCOC distribution list.

///////////////////////// Annual Declarations (ADs) /////////////////////////

5. (C) The ES/ICC reported that 72 Subscribing States had submitted ADs for 2007. This was 15 more than had been submitted for 2006. This positive increase was due in large part to the extensive "inreach" efforts of the ES/ICC and the incoming and outgoing chairs. However, while the number of ADs continues to increase, approximately 45% of HCOC Subscribing States have yet to submit ADs. The ES/ICC encouraged all HCOC states to use "inreach" to remind those who had not submitted ADs of their HCOC commitments. The ES/ICC also reminded Subscribing States that ADs for 2008 would be due on March 31, 2009.

////////////////////////////// Prelaunch Notifications (PLNs) //////////////////////////////

6. (C) The ES/ICC reported that since the HCOC's 2007 annual meeting, 50 PLNs had been submitted. Approximately 54% of all PLNs were submitted by Russia - 27. In addition to Russia, Argentina, France, Japan, Norway, and Ukraine had submitted PLNs. The ES/ICC called on all Subscribing States to file PLNs when called for in a timely manner. The ES/ICC also reported that it had received a notification from Russia on December 29, 2007 that Russia would suspend submission of PLNs for an initial period of one year, beginning on January 1, 2008. Russia added that the reason for this decision was the persistent noncompliance by other HCOC states with their obligations on transparency (i.e., the U.S. not submitting PLNs). Russia added that the decision to impose the moratorium on PLNs was made by former Russian President Vladimir Putin.

////////////////////////// General/Opening Statements //////////////////////////

7. (C) Australia, Benin, Chile, France, Japan, South Korea, Libya, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Slovenia (on behalf of the European Union, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine), Switzerland, Ukraine, and the U.S. made general statements.

8. (C) Australia said the continuing proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of WMD delivery is of great concern and noted that the complementary and reinforcing nature of the HCOC and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is central to addressing the global missile threat. In this context, Australia sees the true value of the HCOC in its effectiveness as a confidence building measure where transparency measures help build trust. But the effectiveness of the HCOC can only be realized if all HCOC members implement their HCOC obligations and submit ADs and PLNs. Accordingly, Australia urged all HCOC states to take their obligations seriously, noting that the issues the HCOC was designed to address remain as relevant now as when the HCOC was established.

9. (C) Benin proposed holding a conference in Benin prior to the next HCOC annual meeting to promote HCOC universalization and to raise awareness among developing countries about the global and regional security challenges posed by ballistic missile proliferation.

10. (C) Chile (on behalf of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) expressed concern about the growing threat to peace and security from ballistic missiles and affirmed its support for the HCOC as an important and relevant arms control tool. Chile said the HCOC complements other initiatives in the missile nonproliferation area and welcomed the HCOC's four newest members. It also urged all HCOC states to work to help fill the membership gaps in key areas, including via greater outreach to Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, Chile encouraged all HCOC members to fully comply with their HCOC obligations.

11. (C) France reiterated its strong support for the HCOC but regretted that universalization of the Code has not yet been achieved and called on all states to subscribe. France also called on all HCOC states to notify, or resume notification of, space and missile launches. Finally, France announced its readiness to serve as HCOC Chair in 2010-2011.

12. (C) Japan noted that the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to be a serious threat to international peace and security and expressed particular concern about missile developments in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. In light of this, Japan has been pleased by the steady expansion of the HCOC in terms of membership. However, Japan regrets that not all HCOC countries are submitting ADs and PLNs. Echoing Australia's comments, Japan noted the value and significance of the HCOC in promoting confidence and transparency, and urged all HCOC states to give serious thought to the importance of meeting their HCOC obligations. To promote universalization, Japan encouraged greater outreach to countries in Asia. Japan also encouraged HCOC Subscribing States to host voluntary site visits.

13. (C) South Korea agreed that the proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities continues to pose a serious challenge to the security and stability of the international community, and said that addressing this urgent issue must be at the top of the international agenda. The ROK believes the HCOC can play a role in missile nonproliferation and reaffirmed its support for the HCOC as the only international norm against ballistic missile proliferation. The ROK also urged all HCOC states to submit ADs and PLNs, and encouraged additional "inreach" to HCOC countries to remind them to implement the Code's transparency measures and encourage their participation at HCOC meetings. In addition, the ROK urged further outreach -- particularly to countries with significant ballistic missile and space launch capabilities -- noting that there is still a long way to go before the HCOC is universalized. Finally, the ROK urged the HCOC to table a resolution on the HCOC at the 63rd UNGA, explaining that this would be additional way to promote the HCOC.

14. (C) Libya called on all states to support the HCOC and urged that monies now being spent to develop missiles be redirected to peaceful purposes and to meeting the needs of developing countries. Libya also asked all Subscribing States to fulfill their transparency and other obligations under the Code and reported that it is taking steps to adopt national legislation consistent with international agreements and resolutions on missile issues. Libya also said that it continues to seek MTCR membership.

15. (C) The Netherlands said the HCOC remains an essential instrument in the fight against missile proliferation. To be successful, it must have the active support of all HCOC countries. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands has sent a written message to all Subscribing States urging them to meet their HCOC obligations and to participate in the HCOC annual meeting. The Netherlands also supported increased outreach to promote universalization and the tabling of a resolution on HCOC at the upcoming UNGA.

16. (C) Russia focused on improving the HCOC, saying that it is of the utmost interest to Russia that the Code runs effectively and at full capacity because Russia considers the HCOC as the first step toward a global regime on missile nonproliferation. In this context, Russia greatly appreciated the message sent by the Dutch Foreign Minister urging all countries to fulfill their HCOC obligations. Russia also welcomed the addition of four more countries to the HCOC membership roster but noted that these countries do not make a qualitative difference. Instead, Russia believes, the HCOC should work to bring in those countries like Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan that have significant missile programs. In 2004, Russia put forward three proposals to amend the HCOC to make it more attractive to these countries, but so far there has been no interest in them. Russia would like a good discussion of these proposals or other ideas to make the Code more effective and more interesting. Until this is done - and until the HCOC is working properly - Russia sees noneed to promote the HCOC at the UN or to do more outreach. In Russia's view, the HCOC needs to get its house in order and become an attractive venue for countries with a real perspective on missile issues. Only when Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan are inside the door can the HCOC be an international venue for developing confidence on missile issues and become a launching pad for a multilateral dialogue aimed at elaborating a legally binding agreement for a global missile nonproliferation regime.

17. (C) Slovenia (on behalf of the EU and associated states) stressed the importance of faithful implementation of the Code by Subscribing States and regretted that the submission of PLNs and ADs and attendance at HCOC annual meetings remains weak. The EU feared that a persistent lack of full implementation of the HCOC threatens its viability and called on all HCOC countries to meet their obligations in full. The EU also urged continued outreach to encourage more counties in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America to subscribe, as well as the tabling of a resolution on the HCOC at the 63rd UNGA. Finally, noting that the proliferation of ballistic missile delivery systems for WMD is of growing concern and citing Iran and North Korea as particularly worrisome in this regard, the EU stressed the importance of a multilateral response to ballistic missile proliferation and the role of the HCOC in fulfilling this need as it is the sole multilateral confidence building and transparency instrument in the field of missile proliferation.

18. (C) Switzerland agreed that the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD poses a threat to global and regional security and said no effort should be spared to address this issue. Switzerland therefore hoped that the UN Panel on Missiles scheduled to meet during the first week of June 2008 would have a good outcome. Switzerland similarly noted with interest Russia's proposal for a global INF. It also agreed with the need for continued outreach to states with significant missile capabilities and strongly encouraged all HCOC countries to submit their ADs. While the number of ADs submitted each year continues to rise, it is still not enough. Switzerland also hoped that the PLN issue could be resolved soon and that all countries that launch SLVs and missiles would submit HCOC PLNs.

19. (C) Ukraine echoed the call for all states to fulfill their HCOC commitments and urged further outreach to the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia in order to truly universalize the Code. Ukraine also supported discussing ways to strengthen and enhance the HCOC.

20. (C) In response to a decision taken at the November 2004 HCOC meeting, the U.S. included in its opening statement discussion of the nature of the missile proliferation threat, its significance for Subscribing States, and measures that could be taken to address this threat. The U.S. noted that the trend is toward missiles of increasing ranges, payload, lethality, and sophistication, and stressed the particular concerns raised by the missile programs in Iran and North Korea. The U.S. urged all HCOC states to fully and effectively implement UNSCRs 1718, 1737, 1747, and 1803, and to cooperate in establishing a global network of interlocking national export control systems consistent with the requirements of UNSCR 1540. In addition, the U.S. noted the value of taking steps to stem the flow of financial support for activities of missile proliferation concern and underscored the critical role export control organizations and experts can play in assisting financial jurisdictions in restricting proliferation activities. The U.S. also called on all countries to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and to support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

////////////////////////////// Proposals to Improve the HCOC /////////////////////////////

21. (SBU) The Chair asked countries to comment on the issues raised during opening statements and/or on any of the proposals that had been tabled for discussion.

German Proposal on PLNs, ADs, Definitions, and Consultations ///////////////////////////////////////////// /

22. (C) Germany clarified that its proposal was a resubmission of a paper first circulated in 2003. The ROK welcomed the German paper as a useful best practices guide for PLNs and ADs. The ROK also agreed that for PLNs, the MTCR definition of a Category I missile should be used as the HCOC standard. The U.S. disagreed, noting that the HCOC had long ago determined there was no need for formal definitions in the HCOC - or definitions borrowed from other organizations -- as long as each country explained its approach. The U.S. also thought there was no need for a formal consultative mechanism and said the HCOC needed to be flexible in terms of formats for ADs and PLNs. However, the U.S. did agree that Germany's paper could be a useful reference tool. France also urged a flexible approach to ADs and PLNs, noting that the current system seems to be working well. Poland supported the German proposal, especially with regard to formatting PLNs and ADs.

German Paper Providing Statistics on HCOC PLNs Compared with Launches Registered Through Open Sources ///////////////////////////////////////////// //////////

23. (C) Germany noted that the paper was self-explanatory and welcomed any questions or feedback. There was no discussion of the paper.

Russian Proposal to Enhance the HCOC ////////////////////////////////////

24. (C) Russia explained that it had tabled the same three proposals every year for the last four years and was doing so again because it believed this was the way to attract " important" countries to the Code. In Russia's view, the only way to have a viable HCOC is to bring in all countries with ballistic missile programs and space programs. In other words, Russia said, the HCOC does not need to achieve full universality. Instead, Russia believes what is needed is for the HCOC to be a club that represents the opinions of all countries with ballistic missile and space programs. In Russia's view, once the HCOC is such a club, it can move forward to create a system to affect positively missile development worldwide.

25. (C) In light of this, and keeping in mind Russia's assessment that the meetings that led to the formation of the HCOC did not properly take into account the concerns of many countries with missile and space programs, Russia has, since 2004, put forward three proposals to address these countries' concerns. Russia would like to discuss these proposals - and any other ideas for attracting key missile possessing countries to the HCOC. In Russia's view, unless there is change, the HCOC will never be inclusive, nor will it be of interest to key countries. Moreover, and as Russia has said many times before, the HCOC needs to discuss these matters seriously. The HCOC also needs to fully implement all transparency measures if it wants to avoid further aggravating the situation.

26. (C) Germany agreed on the importance of bringing the countries mentioned by Russia into the HCOC. However, Germany said its outreach activities have shown that the biggest obstacle to these countries joining the HCOC is not that HCOC states are obliged to make ADs or PLNs but the fact that most current HCOC countries do not implement the HCOC's confidence building measures (CBMs).

27. (C) Noting the numerous implicit, if not explicit, comments made by HCOC participants thus far about the lack of PLNs from the United States, the U.S. underscored its ongoing and active support of the HCOC and reminded participating countries of its position on PLNs. In particular, and as it made clear at the HCOC launching conference in 2002, the U.S. intends to make PLNs under the provisions of an agreement worked out with the Russian Federation which predates the HCOC. This system is to be established and operated in connection with the U.S.-Russia Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). However, the necessary implementing arrangements for the JDEC have not been finalized, and the U.S. has not yet been able to provide HCOC PLNs in the manner announced in 2002. But although it is not yet established, neither is the JDEC "on hold." The U.S. continues to discuss this matter with Russia at senior levels - most recently at the May 19 Rood-Kislyak talks in Oslo - and both sides have agreed to further technical talks on the JDEC in June 2008. The U.S. is hopeful that these talks will be productive and help advance the HCOC PLNs issue.

28. (C) Russia responded that it had never linked HCOC PLNs to progress on the JDEC. In Russia's estimation, if a country makes a political commitment, it should honor it fully. Continuing, Russia said it is serious about its commitments and did not take the decision to suspend its PLNs lightly. This decision was made by the Russian President. Moreover, Russia said, the GOR does not appreciate emotional demarches urging it to restart PLNs. Instead, countries should talk to Russia seriously about important issues like how to bring the remaining missile possessors into the HCOC.

29. (C) Russia also did not agree with Germany's assessment that countries like China are not joining the HCOC because all countries inside the HCOC are not fulfilling their commitments. Russia views this as a pretext or excuse for countries to stay away from the HCOC. Russia believes the problem is that the important missile possessor countries are being ignored by the HCOC. What the HCOC needs to do, Russia said, is adopt an approach like the UN Panel on Missiles in New York, where the views of countries around the global are taken into account. The point is to bring in serious countries, not to universalize the Code for the sake of universalization.

30. (C) The Netherlands noted that Russia seems to attach great importance to a certain type of HCOC expansion - expansion that Russia believes will strengthen the HCOC. -- 1. (S/NF) Per reftel, Post supplies the following information on the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF, "Abu al-Abbas Group"), which retains a leadership structure but no apparent intent or operational capability to carry out terrorist actions in the West Bank or Gaza Strip.

2. (S/NF) The PLF is led by Wasal Abu Yusif, a member of the PLO Central Council resident in Ramallah. Abu Yusif occasionally attends PLO Executive Committee sessions as an observer (the PLF lacks an official seat), where he generally supports positions advanced by the Fatah leadership and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), including recognition of the PLO platform and PLO agreements with Israel. The PLF has a small office in Ramallah and another in Gaza City that is occasionally open. The PLF has been a minor political faction here since 2003, garnering only 3,000 votes out of approximately 1,000,000 cast in January 2006 legislative elections. Post does not have any information suggesting involvement of PLF activists in planning, supporting or carrying out acts of terror from 2003 on. The PLF opened several mourning houses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip when Muhammad Abbas/Zaydan (Abu al-Abbas) died in Baghdad in March 2004, but this was not accompanied by any demonstrations or violence.

3. (S/NF) The PLF's activity in the Gaza Strip has been minimal since the death of Abu al-Abbas' official successor (and Abu Yusif's predecessor), Abu Ali Halab, in 2006. Post is not aware of any PLF claims of responsibility for rocket/mortar or perimeter fence attacks from Gaza from 2003 on.

4. (S/NF) Post has seen no indications that PLF splinter elements exist in the West Bank or Gaza Strip.

5. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. WALLES