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248259 2/11/2010 5:55 10STATE12558 Secretary of State UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY VZCZCXRO0923 OO RUEHIK DE RUEHC #2558/01 0420604 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O R 110555Z FEB 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1335 RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 0395 RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA IMMEDIATE 0956 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0641 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 0476 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 0944 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2269 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 0493 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 6736 RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0958 RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE 0791 RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU IMMEDIATE 0782 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 2713 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0710 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2244 RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO IMMEDIATE 0602 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 9221 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0648 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4029 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2191 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0657 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 4328 RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM IMMEDIATE 2606 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0983 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 6349 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 4147 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 8007 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0054 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 3018 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0936 RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION IMMEDIATE 0716 RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 9477 RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0065 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2874 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 3917 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0280 RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0547 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO IMMEDIATE 1733 RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0169 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3053 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7222 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 1313 RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 8319 NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0751 SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9799 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 STATE 012558
SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, PGOV, HA, SOCI, MCAP, MARR, SNAR, ASEC, EFIN, KJUS, KPKO, XL SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH)
STATE 00012558 001.2 OF 011
1. (SBU) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs seven and eight. Action Posts are requested to report back to Washington by February 16, 2010.
2. (SBU) Background: In response to the massive January 12 earthquake in Haiti, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) on January 18 to generate an additional 3,500 uniformed peacekeepers for the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUSTAH's mandate, which includes assisting the Government of Haiti to provide a secure and stable environment, and restoring and maintaining the rule of law, public safety and public order (for economic and political development) was not changed. Of the 3,500 new uniformed personnel, 2,000 will be military (infantry, engineering and other specialized units) and 1,500 will be police (individual police, corrections officers, and formed police units -- FPUs).
3. (SBU) This cable responds to an explicit tasking by the inter-agency Deputies Committee to prioritize helping MINUSTAH reach full capacity and effectiveness, not only to allow DOD drawdown plans to proceed on our desired timeline but also to ensure that the significant investment made by the USG to date in relief for Haiti is sustained and allows for successful transition to the recovery phase.
4. (SBU) When UNDPKO's Office of Military Affairs (OMA) requested offers from Member
STATE 00012558 002.2 OF 011
SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION States (via fax to NY Missions on 19 January), it asked that all new troops and police be fully self-sustainable, i.e., that all newly arriving units and individuals bring food for thirty days and water for three days. From then on, MINUSTAH would provide a designated camping space and food, water, and diesel fuel, but would not be able to deliver these items to the units. UNDPKO preferred that pre- earthquake troop and police contributing counties (TCC/PCCs) provide additional forces, but has entertained and accepted offers from others with specialized capabilities and a clear capacity to be self-sustainable. DPKO notes that French language ability is not required, but is a definite plus in this challenging near-term environment, especially for police units. All military and police units are provided on a fully reimbursable basis. All TCCs/PCCs must work directly with UNDPKO/OMA through their missions in New York.
5. (SBU) Many countries, including the U.S., are also providing uniformed assets to assist the Government of Haiti on a bilateral basis. The US Joint Task Force is the largest of the bilateral contributors. As the humanitarian situation stabilizes over the next several weeks, the US, the UN and the GoH will be conducting assessments of needs through several anticipated phases. Based on the agreed Statement of Principles (http://usun.state.gov/documents/organizati on/135902.pdf), the US seeks to coordinate joint planning with the United Nations in order to synchronize our efforts with those of the United Nations. It is possible that a determination will be made to further increase the authorized levels of MINUSTAH peacekeepers.
STATE 00012558 003.2 OF 011
6. (SBU) As of February 8, UNDPKO has received offers of over 2,000 military and 1,189 police (estimated); it has vetted and accepted 1,510 military and 646 police.
==MILITARY OFFERS AND ACCEPTANCES:
--Brazil: UNDPKO accepted the offer of a 900 troop infantry battalion for MINUSTAH. Troops will begin deployment 10 February. Brazil has stated these troops are fully self-sustaining and that it will transport them to Haiti.
--South Korea: UNDPKO accepted the offer of a contingent of 240 peacekeepers, including 120 military engineers. The national assembly unanimously approved ROK deployment February 9. An advance team of 30 soldiers is scheduled to depart February 10, followed by 20 more on February 17 or 18. The remaining 190 troops will probably depart on February 27. All ROK soldiers will travel by commercial air to Santo Domingo; there may be other lift requirements from there. The ROK contingent is authorized to remain in Haiti until the end of the year, at which time the mission could be extended.
--Japan: UNDPKO accepted an offer of a 190 troop engineering company for MINUSTAH, which will arrive 11-14 February by air. Japan already has 35 troops on the ground which will be accompanied by an additional 160 support personnel that will not be detailed to MINUSTAH.
--Dominican Republic: UNDPKO has accepted the offer of a 150 troop infantry company. The GoDR informed the U.S. that that the GoDR troops do not need any additional training or equipment however, the U.S. stands ready to consider any training or equipment needs which may arise. The
STATE 00012558 004.2 OF 011
SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION Dominican Republic is a Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) partner and has received ~$4.3M for peacekeeping capacity development since FY2008. It is also a member of the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) multilateral PKO force, which GPOI also supports.
--Guatemala: UNDPKO is considering the offer of a 50 troops contingent. The Department is seeking to learn of any training or equipment needs Guatemala may have. The U.S. stands ready to consider any requests from the Guatemalan contingent for training or equipment. Guatemala is already in MINUSTAH and is a GPOI partner which has received ~$4M for peacekeeping capacity development since FY2006. It is also a member of CFAC which GPOI supports.
--Uruguay: UNDPKO is considering the offer of a 150 troop infantry company. We are seeking to learn about and stand ready to consider any official Uruguayan needs for training or equipment. Uruguay has a contingent already in MINUSTAH and has been a GPOI partner since FY 2008. Uruguay has received about $2.2M in FY 2008 and FY 2009 funding for peacekeeping capacity development. GPOI is also using $2.299M in FY 2005 residual funds to provide replacement Jeep J8 or similar troop transport vehicles to replace the aging Soviet vehicles currently in use in MINUSTAH.
--Peru: UNDPKO is considering the offer of a 150 troop infantry company. The U.S. is seeking to learn and stands ready to consider any requests to augment Peruvian training or equipment needs; Peru is a contingent already in MINUSTAH and a GPOI partner which has received ~$6.8M for peacekeeping capacity development since FY 2007.
STATE 00012558 005.2 OF 011
--Bolivia: Offer TBD. We are seeking to learn and stand ready to consider any need to augment the Bolivian informal offer. The Department is seeking to learn about any training/equipment needs they may have; Bolivia has a contingent already in MINUSTAH and is a GPOI partner that received ~$1.2M since FY 2008.
--Sri Lanka: Offer TBD. UNDPKO/OMA has received this offer. Sri Lanka is under sanctions; a policy decision would have to be made concerning whether GPOI can engage Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has a contingent in MINUSTAH and is a GPOI partner that has received about $2.8M for peacekeeping capacity development since FY2007.
==FORMED POLICE UNIT (FPU) OFFERS AND ACCEPTANCES: (Note: FPUs are para-military police units usually specializing in crowd control; they usually contain between 100-160 police officers, although a few countries are offering smaller contingents. End Note.)
--Bangladesh: Offer of 1 FPU. UNDPKO/OMA has accepted this offer. We stand ready to consider any need to augment the Bangladeshi offer. Bangladesh is a member of MINUSTAH and a GPOI partner that received ~$7.1M since FY 2005. --Rwanda: Tentative offer of one FPU in support of DPKO's medium term planning for MINUSTAH and UNDPKO/OMA has accepted. The Department has offered to provide some equipment to support a Rwandan deployment and is awaiting further word on Kigali's agreement to deploy. Current estimates of Rwanda's needs are approximately $2 million; GPOI has identified $2M to support the deployment of this FPU should Rwanda formally commit to its deployment. Rwanda is a GPOI partner that has received over
STATE 00012558 006.2 OF 011
SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION $7M in GPOI funds and over $5M in PKO Supplemental funds for peacekeeping capacity development. Rwanda is already a member of MINUSTAH.
--Pakistan: Offer of an FPU in support of DPKO's long-term needs for MINUSTAH. UNDPKO/OMA has accepted. Pakistan has approximately $2M available in GPOI funding which it will be urged to use to support this possible deployment to MINUSTAH.
--Nepal: Offer of an FPU in support of long term needs. UNDPKO/OMA has accepted. The U.S. stands ready to consider any training/equipment needs they may have. Nepal is already a MINUSTAH member and a GPOI partner that has received about $5.7M for peacekeeping capacity development since FY 2006. Nepal is also slated to receive $3M in residual FY 2005 equipment funds to support its upcoming deployment to UNAMID.
--Others: UNDPKO has accepted offers for FPUs to meet their immediate needs from Spain, Netherlands, France, Italy, and Israel. UNDPKO has accepted FPUs to meet its medium-term needs (April/May deployment) from India (March deployment possible, pending on the ground equipment assessment), and Turkey. Finally, India and Pakistan have all offered FPUs for MINUSTAH's long-term needs (July deployment), which UNDPKO has accepted.
End Background
7. Action Request for: --WHA: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Colombia, Bridgetown for Saint Lucia and Dominica, Brazil, Canada, Jamaica, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Mexico; --EAP: Japan, South Korea; --EUR: Greece, France, Italy, Turkey, other NATO Countries;
STATE 00012558 007.2 OF 011
SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION --AF: Rwanda, Senegal, Benin; --SCA: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan. Some of these countries have offered, or expressed interest in offering, additional troops or police either to MINUSTAH or on a bilateral basis with the GoH. Others have been identified as potential contributors. Posts are requested to inquire with their host governments as to the status of the offer or intentions. Posts are also requested to inquire whether the host government is having difficulties procuring equipment, meeting self-sustainability standards, and/or requires assistance with logistics or transportation. Lastly, posts should inquire as to whether the host government expects to remain on schedule with their deployment. If host government expresses doubts regarding meeting their deployment commitments, posts are requested to ask host governments to relay that information to DPKO as soon as possible, so that the UN can plan for alternative contingencies. Specific requests for detailed information are as follows:
--WHA =Brazil: 150 military police expected within the week and an additional 750 troops thereafter
----Sustainability: These forces were meant to replace those currently on the ground in Haiti, but our understanding is that Brazil has decided instead to leave in Haiti those troops that had been scheduled for rotation - how long will the Brazilian forces remain plussed-up (i.e. six months, twelve months, etc.)? Is there a replacement plan?
----Lift: Have they contracted sea and/or airlift? What needs to be done in order to speed their deployment?
----Arrival: When will the forces be operational in Haiti? =Canada: 2,000 troops currently on the ground in Haiti
----Sustainability: What is the drawdown schedule of these forces? Is there a replacement plan? Would they consider contributing one or more French-speaking formed police units to MINUSTAH?
----Assets: Will they leave behind any assets for
STATE 00012558 008.2 OF 011
SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION MINUSTAH?
----Enabling: Are they willing/able to provide training or equipment, particularly for potential French-speaking TCCs and/or PCCs who may need resources to deploy and sustain as part of MINUSTAH? =Argentina (200), =Peru (150), =Uruguay (100), and =Guatemala (50) have all made official offers of troops to the UN.
----Firmness: What is the status of each country's offer? What kind of unit/specialization, and what numbers?
----Sustainability: How long would these forces be prepared to remain in Haiti?
----Lift: Do they have sea and/or airlift capacity? What would need to be done in order to speed their deployment?
----Enabling: What training or equipment do the forces require to be self-sustaining and effective?
----Arrival: When would the forces be operational in Haiti? =Bolivia has made an informal offer to the UN.
----Firmness: What is the status of the offer? What kind of unit/specialization, and what numbers?
----Sustainability: How long would these forces be prepared to remain in Haiti?
----Lift: Would they need sea and/or airlift? What would need to be done in order to speed their deployment?
----Enabling: What training or equipment would the forces require to be self-sustaining and effective? =Mexico and =Colombia have shown potential willingness to send FPUs.
----Firmness: What is status of that potential offer? What kind of unit/specialization, and what numbers?
----Sustainability: How long would these forces be prepared to remain in Haiti?
----Lift: Would they need sea and/or airlift? What would need to be done in order to speed their deployment?
----Enabling: What training or equipment would the forces require to be self-sustaining and effective? =Dominica and =St Lucia may have Creole speaking police that could deploy as FPUs.
----Interest: Would such formed police units be available for service in Haiti?
----Enabling: What would be required in order to make such
STATE 00012558 009.2 OF 011
SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION a deployment possible? --EAP =Japan: 190 engineers (together with 160 national support elements not under MINUSTAH authority) pledged.
----Sustainability: How long are these forces prepared to remain in Haiti? Is there a replacement plan?
----Arrival: Our current understanding is that the Japanese forces will arrive by air between 11-28 Feb, and that their remaining heavy equipment will arrive by the end of March. Is this deployment on schedule?
----Enabling: Is Japan willing/able to provide enabling support for other TCCs and/or PCCs who may need resources to deploy and sustain as part of MINUSTAH? =South Korea: 240 engineers pledged.
----Sustainability: How long are these forces prepared to remain in Haiti?
----Arrival: Our current understanding is that these forces will arrive by sea by the end of March. Is this deployment on schedule? Any lift or other enabling requirements not yet met? --EUR =Greece has made an official offer of troops to the UN.
----Firmness: What is the status of the offer? What kind of unit/specialization, and what numbers? What length of duty?
----Lift: Have they contracted sea and/or airlift? What would need to be done in order to speed their deployment?
----Arrival: When would the forces be operational in Haiti? =France: One FPU is currently deployed for 6 months.
----Follow-on/Additional: Is a follow-on deployment possible? Can an additional FPU be deployed?
----Enabling others: Are they willing/able to provide enabling support, particularly for potential French- speaking TCCs and/or PCCs who may need resources to deploy and sustain as part of MINUSTAH? =Italy: One FPU is slated to arrive end of February for 6 months.
----Firmness: Is the unit still scheduled to arrive on time?
----Follow-on/Additional: Is a follow-on deployment possible? Can an additional FPU be deployed?
----Enabling others: Are they willing/able to provide enabling support for other TCCs and/or PCCs who may need resources to deploy and sustain as part of MINUSTAH?
STATE 00012558 010.2 OF 011
SUBJECT: FORCE GENERATION ISSUES TO REINFORCE THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION =Turkey: 1 FPU pledged (they have indicated tour would be 12 months)
----Firmness: Can the FPU offer be formalized?
----Arrival: When is the earliest the FPU could arrive?
----Enabling: What training or equipment, if any, would the forces require to be self-sustaining and effective?
----Lift: Do they have sea and/or airlift capacity? What would need to be done in order to speed their deployment? =Special action on other NATO Countries: Are they willing/able to provide enabling support for other TCCs and/or PCCs who may need resources to deploy and sustain as part of MINUSTAH? --AF =Rwanda: one FPU confirmed as available for 12 months.
----Arrival: We have been told that the projected start- date of the deployment is May. Is this still the case? Could they arrive sooner?
----Enabling: State PM has told us that they are prepared to provide necessary training and equipping. Has this been formalized and funded?
----Lift: How is sea and/or airlift being covered? What would need to be done in order to speed their deployment? =Senegal and =Benin: may have French speaking police that could deploy as FPUs. DPKO has expressed interest in pursuing this possibility.
----Interest: Would such FPUs be available for service in Haiti?
----Enabling: What would be required in order to make such a deployment possible? --SCA =India: one FPU confirmed as available for 12 months.
----Arrival: We have been told that the projected start- date of the deployment is May. Is this still the case? Could they arrive sooner?
----Enabling: What training or equipment , if any, would the forces require to be self-sustaining and effective?
----Lift: Do they have sea and/or airlift capacity? What would need to be done in order to speed their deployment? =Pakistan: one FPU confirmed as available -- private sector buy-in to product development and research. As Shani put it, "we want to attract smart money." There will actually be two or three different funds by sub-sector, with a five-year investment period, and the Life Sciences Fund program is expected to last for ten years. Opper lauded Israeli's entrepreneurial spirit, but cautioned that the full impact of the new Life Sciences Funds would only be seen in a decade.
6. (U) In announcing the search for managers of the new fund, Shani made clear that only well-experienced VC fund managers would be considered: those who had managed VC funds of at least $750 million for at least 7 years. Competence in dealing with USG regulatory authorities (FDA, USPTO, NIH) was noted as a pre-requisite for potential fund managers, possibly indicating the export-driven intent of the new VC program. Additionally, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) Board of Directors has announced plans to launch a new equity index covering the biomed sector. Of the approximately 100 technology companies currently traded on the TASE, 38 are in biomed industries, mostly early stage enterprises engaged in life sciences, biotech, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment R&D. The total market value of all biomed shares is US$2.2 billion.
7. (U) Job creation is apparently another objective; Israel has more than 160 biotechnology R&D companies, of which 90% have fewer than 50 employees and most do not ordinarily reach commercial levels of development. Finding more ways to employ Israel's biotech intellectual capital can reduce the brain-drain phenomenon appearing in academia and medicine.
Comment
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8. (SBU) By reassessing its role in S&T development across a range of economic sectors, the GOI is trying to grapple with both present and future problems. For the present, it is trying to maintain Israel's competitiveness as a venue for high tech R&D and production, doing what is needed to attract the Intel and other plants and development centers, and the investment they provide. One the practical side, such measures would help address current unemployment and budget deficit problems. For the future, GOI investments in Venture Capital funds, technology incubators, the binational research foundations (BIRD, BSF and BARD) and other measures aim at securing Israel's technology leadership and productivity in coming decades. Given the challenges the future poses - regaining education excellence, better integrating minorities into the workplace, finding the capital to pursue expensive technologies - Kandel is asking the right questions. An activist state role figures largely in the GOI responses.
Cunningham
