Wikileaks - MDLXXVII
244789 1/22/2010 2:16 10STATE6355 Secretary of State UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 10STATE2082|10STATE4108 VZCZCXRO4520 OO RUEHDBU RUEHPOD RUEHSL DE RUEHC #6355/01 0220225 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 220216Z JAN 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0346 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4698 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 1600 RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 2159 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 4271 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2164 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU IMMEDIATE 9960 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2567 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 5876 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 7308 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 1838 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 0875 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 6132 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2912 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 8504 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0035 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 6297 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 1672 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 1905 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1453 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 1932 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 2846 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5988 RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6614 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 3757 RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 7703 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 3153 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 8503 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 7105 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 0082 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 3698 RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 7359 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6610 RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1753 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 8902 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 9434 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1143 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8116 RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA IMMEDIATE 2588 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 1713 RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 0008 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 2262 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4729 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3836 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 2958 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 2896 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2589 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 8081 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE 4586 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 8907 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0633 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 2227 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 7551 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 4442 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1998 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR IMMEDIATE 7812 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0600 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 3171 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 5839 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0943 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE 8369 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 3830 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5723 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 2006 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8919 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6899 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 9550 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 STATE 006355
SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, AF SUBJECT: OUTREACH ON LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. (A) STATE 2082 (NOTAL) B. (B) STATE 4108 (NOTAL)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. The United States expects the main headlines of the London Conference on Afghanistan on January 28 will be the announcement of an international trust fund to support Afghan-led reintegration efforts and the wide endorsement of NATO,s plan for conditions-based, province-by-province transition to Afghan lead. The conference will provide a valuable opportunity for the international community to demonstrate its support for the Afghan government's ambitious agenda as outlined in President Karzai's inaugural speech. This cable outlines our overall priorities for the London Conference, and requests posts convey and seek support as appropriate for these points from host governments by January 25. Embassies Moscow, Beijing, Ankara, Berlin, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh see also paragraphs 8-11. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.
BACKGROUND
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2. (SBU) On January 28, approximately 77 delegations will meet in London to discuss security, economic development and governance, and international coordination in Afghanistan. Secretary Clinton will lead the U.S. delegation to the conference, which will be chaired by UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and UK PM Gordon Brown.
3. (SBU) The U.S. is seeking the following desired outcomes of the London Conference:
-- Reintegration. The London Conference will demonstrate strong international support for Afghan-led reintegration efforts by announcing a reintegration trust fund. The governments of the United Kingdom and Japan are working closely with the government of Afghanistan (GoA) and the United Nations Development Program to outline the structure of the trust fund and will also demarche key donor capitals to seek announcements of initial commitments at the London Conference. A specific U.S. commitment has not yet been determined.
-- Transition. On January 20, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) provisionally approved a plan for conditions-based security transition to the GoA. After consultations with
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non-NATO ISAF contributors, the NAC plans to finally approve the plan before January 28. The plan outlines the security criteria and the process for authorizing and implementing province-by-province transition. Transition will need to take into account governance and development factors in each province which the NATO Senior Civilian Representative will develop in consultation with the GoA and international civilian stakeholders over the next month in Afghanistan. The London Conference will welcome this ISAF plan, look forward implementing transition as soon as conditions allow, and note that transition planning is not an exit strategy from Afghanistan.
-- Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The London Conference will endorse the concept of annual targets for ANSF growth, but will stress the primary importance of the quality as well as the number of ANSF. The London Conference will endorse ANSF force-level targets for 2010 and 2011 approved by the JCMB on January 20 and will urge the international community to provide all necessary support to reach those targets. The JCMB approved growing the Afghan National Police to 109,000 in 2010, 134,000 in 2011, and growing the Afghan National Army to 134,000 in 2010 and 171,600 in 2011.
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-- Development and governance. We expect Afghanistan to present plans on governance and anti-corruption reform at the London conference. On corruption, the government of Afghanistan plans to establish an Independent Oversight Board to oversee the functions of the High Office of Oversight (HOO, the main anti-corruption body in Afghanistan), second prosecutors to the HOO to give it enforcement capabilities, prioritize the passage of legislation to enforce the requirement for asset declarations by Afghan officials, and improve administrative procedures. On governance, Afghanistan intends to establish an independent merit-based civil service appointment and vetting process, seek Parliamentary approval for a sub-national governance policy clarifying the roles and responsibilities of provincial and district officials, and implement targeted programs to improve service delivery in key districts.
-- International Civilian Coordination. The UN may announce plans to strengthen its presence in Afghanistan in order to reinforce UNAMA's preeminent role in the coordination of civilian assistance. Similarly, NATO may announce plans to strengthen the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in order to coordinate the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other civilian assistance delivered through ISAF channels, support UNAMA's preeminent role in civilian assistance, and
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coordinate political aspects of the ISAF mission. We hope the international leadership team can be introduced at the London Conference, including a new UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), and EU/EC single representative.
-- We are not seeking comment on Afghanistan's elections at the London conference.
4. The outcomes of the London Conference will lay out an agenda for Afghanistan and the international community in the coming months. We will work with the Government of Afghanistan and other partners to produce more detailed plans and programs on reintegration, anti-corruption, governance, development, and other critical issues. When planning is sufficiently advanced to warrant another meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Government of Afghanistan will host a conference in Kabul, presumably this spring.
5. (SBU) Our asks from our partners for the London conference and afterward include:
-- Support for inclusion of the above outcomes in the conference communique and public messaging.
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-- Pledges of contributions to an international reintegration trust fund.
-- Commitment of additional institutional trainers and mentoring teams, and trust fund donations to support the ANSF. Although this is not a pledging conference for security assistance, both the London Conference and the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting on February 4-5 in Istanbul provide opportunities to demonstrate the international community's continuing commitment to enable Afghan forces to begin to assume security responsibility.
Posts should adapt these requests and talking points as appropriate to host country circumstances.
TALKING POINTS
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6. (SBU) Posts may draw from the following points when raising the London Conference with host governments. See also REF B for more detailed points on security transition. Specific national requests for ANSF mentors and trainers and points for use with the media on our overall Afghanistan strategy will be sent SEPTEL. Please inquire from host governments whether they expect to make any announcements at
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London.
Security
-- The United States' main priorities for the London Conference include endorsement of a plan to implement transition of security responsibility to full Afghan leadership and support for Afghan-led reintegration.
-- The transition plan is a tangible demonstration of progress in the overall stability and security of Afghanistan and Afghan ownership and responsibility. Transition will proceed gradually on a province-by-province basis based on rigorous security, governance, and development conditions.
-- Transition of individual provinces to Afghan lead will be undertaken with extensive consultations among the Afghan government, NATO/ISAF, UNAMA, and other key stakeholders, and will take place only when it is clear that security, governance, and development conditions have been met and can be sustained.
-- Transition is not an exit strategy for ISAF, although it is an important step toward fulfilling ISAF's mission. ISAF will retain supporting, enabling, and mentoring/advising
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roles throughout transition. The United States will also maintain a civilian commitment to Afghanistan over the long term.
-- Transition neither implies the commitment of the international community is wavering nor does it presage an imminent reduction in ISAF forces.
-- On the contrary, now is the time to reinforce our contributions in Afghanistan, as President Obama stated in his December 1 address, in order to create the conditions that will allow us to begin the process of drawing down combat forces in the summer of 2011.
-- While London will not be a pledging conference, we will welcome any additional civilian or military contributions that Allies or partners might announce there. At NATO's Defense Ministerial meeting on February 4-5 in Istanbul, we will encourage nations to outline plans to deploy forces pledged in December as rapidly as possible and to commit the institutional trainers and mentors needed to develop the ANSF. In particular, the JCMB's increased ANSF targets can only be met with additional institutional trainers, mentors, and financial contributions.
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Reintegration
-- Equally important will be international support for a process of Afghan-led reintegration of insurgents who choose to give up the fight.
-- The international community offered support to government of Afghanistan principles for a reintegration program on January 20. The aim of reintegration is to stabilize local areas by providing an honourable exit to low and mid level insurgent commanders and fighters who are not committed to insurgent ideology and who are prepared to cease support for insurgent activity and rejoin society.
-- Our support for reintegration is distinct from and should not imply any plans for reconciliation of senior leaders of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The United States only supports reintegration for individuals and groups interested who cease support, whether active or passive, to insurgency, criminality, and violence; who are willing to participate in a free and open society; and who respect the Afghan Constitution and have no existing association with Al-Qaeda.
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-- The Afghan reintegration program will build upon former and existing reintegration programs, and will address shortcomings of past reintegration initiatives. While specific programmatic elements will not be announced until after a national Grand Peace Jirga (traditional council meeting), key elements will be instituting appropriate safeguards and monitoring measures to ensure accountability of reintegrated insurgents.
-- The U.S. strongly supports this process and encourages you to do so as well. Reintegration must be Afghan-led, but it will also require the strong political and financial support of the international community. To demonstrate that support and ensure that financial resources are available as soon as operationally required, the London Conference will announce an international trust fund for reintegration, the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund.
-- The UK, Japan and government of Afghanistan expect $300-500 million will be required to sustain the reintegration program over several years. We will be looking to our international partners at the London Conference to provide support to this important initiative.
-- It is especially important for Muslim countries to
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demonstrate concrete support for reintegration through trust fund commitments, even if they are not specific at this time.
-- The exact mechanics of fund administration remain under discussion, but there will likely be opportunities to provide assistance via UNDP or the Afghan Ministry of Finance.
-- Along with a possible contribution to the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund, the U.S. will use other civilian and military funds to support Afghanistan's reintegration efforts.
-- We envision international funds will be used towards providing economic support to communities, deradicalization and assimilation, conflict resolution, community security, stipends and relocation, administration, training, safeguards and third party assessments and auditing. In no event will these funds be used to simply pay insurgents to stop fighting.
-- All of these programs will be coordinated with the government of Afghanistan. The programs will be tailored to the unique conditions at the local level and may vary community to community. They will benefit law abiding citizens in communities throughout Afghanistan and will not
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be exclusively targeted at one political group or geographical area.
Development and governance
-- We also want the London conference to bolster Afghan efforts to fight corruption and promote good governance, human rights, and economic development.
-- At the January 20 JCMB, the Afghan government shared its plans for a series of reforms that will boost its ability to combat corruption, provide more public services to its people, and effectively manage international aid. We expect the Afghan government to present these plans at the London conference.
-- We support these reforms as the next step toward improved governance and accountability in Afghanistan, recognizing that the Afghans will need to take additional actions to implement these reforms in the coming months.
-- In order to support Afghanistan in these efforts, we expect to announce significant progress toward Afghanistan's qualification for debt relief from the Paris Club and the international financial institutions. On January 25 and
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January 26, we anticipate that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Executive Boards will certify that Afghanistan has completed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which would qualify Afghanistan for one billion dollars in debt forgiveness. After final negotiations, the Paris Club could provide the debt relief as early as its March 2010 meeting.
International civilian coordination
-- Strengthening the coordination of international assistance to Afghanistan is the final theme of the conference.
-- As the international community increases the support provided to the GoA's ambitious agenda, it becomes increasingly important that assistance be closely monitored and coordinated.
-- We are working with the UN to help UNAMA fulfill its preeminent role in coordinating civilian assistance and with NATO to strengthen the role of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in order to coordinate the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), certain assistance, political aspects of the ISAF mission, such as reintegration and provincial transition.
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COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ISSUES
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7. (SBU) FOR MOSCOW AND BEIJING: In preliminary planning meetings in London on the draft joint communique to be published at the conference, Russian and Chinese representatives expressed concern about the communique endorsing a NATO document on transition. The London Conference is being used to welcome and provide wide international endorsement of the outcomes of other processes, including JCMB decisions, World Bank and IMF decisions, and ad hoc negotiations on the reintegration trust fund. Welcoming NATO transition planning fits into this framework and should not be seen as a replacement for other important international fora, such as the UN Security Council. Posts may want to note previous compromises, such as the language used at the Afghanistan conference at The Hague in March 2009 endorsing the ISAF mission.
8. (SBU) FOR ANKARA: The conference will also welcome recent actions taken in regional forums to support the government of Afghanistan, including the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey trilateral summit on January 25 and the Afghanistan Neighbors Summit in Istanbul on January
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26. We encourage regional partners to support and participate in these types of forums and look forward to talking further with Turkey about ways to bolster international support for regional initiatives.
9. (SBU) FOR RIYADH AND ABU DHABI: Saudi Arabian and Emirati support for the reintegration trust fund is vital for both practical and symbolic reasons. Saudi Arabia has previously expressed interest in Taliban mediation initiatives, and they should be encouraged to demonstrate political support for Afghan-led, internationally-supported reintegration by announcing commitments to the trust fund at the London Conference. The UAE is supportive of the reintegration trust fund, but has concerns about how and when the money will be spent. The UAE should be reassured that the US shares its concerns and will work to ensure that the fund is transparent, effective and quick to disburse money to worthy projects.
10. (SBU) FOR BERLIN: Germany continues to seek endorsement of end-state targets for ANSF levels at the London conference. While the Afghan Minister of Defense has also sought a longer-term international commitment, the JCMB only endorsed 2010 and 2011 targets, and United States is only ready to comment on figures for the next two years.
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REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINT OF CONTACT
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11. (U) Please report results of demarche request by cable by January 25, 2010. Please direct questions and slug cables to Jarrett Blanc in S/SRAP and Tom Gramaglia and Carolyn -- 7. (C) Interestingly, there was still a large segment of undecided voters -- 17 percent (a more normal figure so close to the election date would be six or seven percent). Fernando said that about six percent of undecided voters were leaning toward the president while 11 percent were leaning toward Fonseka. As the election approached, the campaigns were adjusting their strategies. Fonseka, he said, was focusing less on Rajapaksa corruption, which many people saw as mud-slinging, and more on a positive economic message. Rajapaksa, too, was giving less time to patriotic themes -- which Fernando's polls said interested few voters -- and more to his own economic-prosperity message.
8. (C) Fernando said that while the overall figures for election violence -- which included trivial matters such as ripping down opponents' posters -- were attributable more to the ruling party, the serious figures on assaults and killings could be attributed to both camps. (NOTE: Our impression is that while opposition forces have engaged in serious violence, pro-Rajapaksa forces have probably been engaging in it more. END NOTE.) Fernando argued that the increase in serious violence by both camps was on balance more detrimental to the Fonseka candidacy. This was because Fonseka was an unknown entity, and when people became rattled by news of violence, they became nervous about change and tended to stick with the leader they knew. Moreover, according to Fernando -- and we have heard this from other supporters of the president -- many people were concerned about the potential of Fonseka becoming a military dictator if put in the position of president.
COMMENT
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9. (C) Fernando's reasoning that election violence helped Rajapaksa is worrisome. Fernando himself seems to us a decent man and appeared to be offering this observation as only that. Others in the Rajapaksa camp, however, may take a more pro-active view and very well may be stirring up violence as a way to scare undecided voters to stick with the devil they know, despite his faults. We took the opportunity of the meeting to pass on our concerns about violence, as well as the importance of a free and fair election, and to note that relations with the U.S. and the rest of the international community could be affected adversely by an election that went poorly. We believe Fernando will pass this message to the president. BUTENIS
