Wikileaks - MCCXLV

187700 1/16/2009 18:59 09STATE4690 Secretary of State CONFIDENTIAL 08STATE129729|08STATE129731 R 161859Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY ASTANA AMEMBASSY BANGKOK AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY PANAMA AMEMBASSY RIGA AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE AMEMBASSY TALLINN AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY VALLETTA AMEMBASSY VILNIUS AMEMBASSY ZAGREB AMCONSUL HONG KONG AIT TAIPEI 0000 AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 004690

HONG KONG ALSO FOR MACAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2034 TAGS: MTCRE, PARM, PREL, MNUC, ETTC, KSCA, TSPA

SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): INFORMING NON-MEMBERS OF THE RESULTS OF THE 2008 CANBERRA MTCR PLENARY (C)

REF: A. 08 STATE 129729 B. 08 STATE 129731

Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. Reason: 1.4 (B), (D).

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2.

2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: In keeping with our efforts to provide key non-members with information about the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and its activities, we want to brief on the results of the November 2008 Canberra MTCR Plenary (reftels). Action addressees, except Canberra, are requested to provide appropriate host government officials with the non-paper in paragraph 3 that summarizes the results of the Canberra MTCR Plenary discussions. While the non-paper is unclassified, posts should ask host governments to treat it as a confidential document. Posts also are requested to make the post-specific talking points in paragraphs 4-31. Embassy Canberra is requested to share the non-paper in paragraph 3 with the Australian MTCR Chair to inform his outreach efforts and to let him know which governments the U.S. is approaching.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER:

(SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE TO BAHRAIN, BELARUS, CHILE, CHINA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, EGYPT, ESTONIA, HONG KONG, INDIA, ISRAEL, JORDAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KUWAIT, LATVIA, LIBYA, LITHUANIA, MACAU, MALAYSIA, MALTA, PAKISTAN, ROMANIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SINGAPORE, SLOVAK REPUBLIC, SLOVENIA, TAIWAN, THAILAND, UAE, AND ALL MTCR PARTNER COUNTRIES.)

As part of our efforts to provide your government with information about the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and its activities, we are providing the following description of the MTCR Partners' discussions at the November 2008 Canberra MTCR Plenary.

The MTCR held its annual Plenary in Canberra, Australia on November 3-7, 2008. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners recognized that more needs to be done to discourage activities of proliferation concern, including the development of WMD delivery systems. They also noted that regional missile proliferation continues to be a serious problem and expressed particular concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. The Partners agreed to conduct outreach to non-Partner countries to promote a greater understanding of the Regime's goals and activities. They also exchanged information on export control challenges, reaffirmed their determination to strengthen missile-related export controls to meet existing and emerging missile threats, and adopted a number of changes to the MTCR Annex to ensure that the Regime's controls keep pace with emerging technologies.

A. REGIONAL MISSILE PROLIFERATION

The MTCR Partners acknowledged that regional missile proliferation continues to be a serious problem and expressed particular concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. They also recognized that more must be done to discourage WMD means-of-delivery programs and activities of proliferation concern. In this context, the Partners noted the direct relevance of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRS) 1718, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835 to the Regime's nonproliferation efforts and undertook to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD missile programs of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law.

B. OUTREACH

The Partners encouraged countries that are not members of the MTCR to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis. They also confirmed their intention individually and through the outreach activities of the Chair to consult and cooperate with non-Partners to promote effective export controls over missiles and missile technology. In addition, the Partners affirmed that continued cooperation with non-Partners would strengthen the Regime's efforts to curb the spread of missile equipment and technology worldwide, and endorsed a number of activities aimed at promoting greater understanding of the Regime's goals and activities, including increased dialogue among Partners and non-Partners on technical issues.

C. MEMBERSHIP

The MTCR Partners discussed membership issues at Canberra. However no new members were admitted to the MTCR at the Canberra Plenary.

D. INFORMATION EXCHANGE

The Partners exchanged information on export control challenges, and reaffirmed their determination to strengthen MTCR controls to meet existing and emerging proliferation threats, including those posed by rapid technological change.

E. TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING (TEM)

The Partners agreed to a number of changes to the MTCR Annex to keep pace with changes in technology and proliferant procurement. Key Annex changes adopted in Canberra included:

--a new entry for "accuracy" in section 2, definitions, of the Annex; --a modification to the note allowing the treatment of some liquid propellant rocket engines as Category II under certain conditions was amended (Item 2.A.1.c); --corrections and additions of Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers to various Annex entries; --two chemical groups were added to the list of controlled esters and plasticisers in Item 4.C.6.d.; --inclusion of fiber placement machines in Item 6.B.1.a.; -- amending the control text for motion simulators/rate tables; --amending the control text for centrifuges; --extending the scope of Item 11.A.4 to cover systems specified in Item 19.A; and --a local definition for "real time control bandwith" was added to Item 15.B.1.b.

F. 2009 REINFORCED POINT OF CONTACT (RPOC) MEETING

A Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting to discuss policy issues intersessionally is expected to be held in Paris in Spring 2009.

G. 2009 PLENARY

The MTCR Partners accepted Brazil's offer to host the 2009 Plenary and serve as Plenary Chair for the subsequent term of office.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER ON PLENARY DISCUSSIONS.

/////////////////////////////////////// TALKING POINTS FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES ///////////////////////////////////////

4. (C) Abu Dhabi: Embassy Abu Dhabi should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE UAE)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes the UAE can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

5. (C) AIT Taipei (for Taiwan Authorities): AIT Taipei should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary to Taiwan officials:

(C/RELEASABLE TAIWAN)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls, with non-members.

--The United States believes Taiwan can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with countries of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

6. (C) Astana: Embassy Astana should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE KAZAKHSTAN)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes Kazakhstan can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

--As we recently discussed with your Embassy in Washington, we also would encourage you to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex.

--At Canberra, the Partners also discussed membership and acknowledged Kazakhstan's interest in joining the Regime. However, no new members were admitted to the Regime at the Canberra Plenary.

-- Australia, as the new MTCR Chair, will inform your government in more detail of the results of the Canberra Plenary.

7. (C) Amman: Embassy Amman should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE JORDAN)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes Jordan can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

8. (C) Bangkok: Embassy Bangkok should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE THAILAND)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes that Thailand can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

9. (C) Beijing: Embassy Beijing should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE CHINA)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the MTCR Partners discussed the important contribution China could make to missile nonproliferation through rigorous implementation and enforcement of export controls on missile items.

--As we have discussed with your government on several previous occasions, proliferation by Chinese entities remains a concern for the United States.

--Ongoing proliferation by Chinese entities also is inconsistent with requirements for Regime membership established in 1994, i.e., that China have effective MTCR export controls and cease activities inconsistent with the MTCR Guidelines.

--We encourage China to take the necessary steps to curtail proliferation by Chinese entities, and implement and enforce effective export control laws.

--Australia, as the new MTCR Chair, will contact you to discuss the results of the Canberra Plenary in more detail.

10. (C) Bratislava: Embassy Bratislava should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE SLOVAK REPUBLIC)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes the Slovak Republic can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

--At Canberra, the Partners also discussed membership and acknowledged the Slovak Republic's interest in joining the Regime. However, no new members were admitted to the Regime at Canberra.

--(if asked) The U.S. position has not changed: we support the Slovak Republic's membership in the MTCR.

--Australia, as the new MTCR Chair, will inform your government in more detail of the results of the Canberra Plenary.

11. (C) Bucharest: Embassy Bucharest should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE ROMANIA)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes Romania can continue to make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

--At Canberra, the Partners also discussed membership and acknowledged Romania's long-standing interest in joining the Regime. However, no new members were admitted to the Regime at Canberra.

--(if asked) The U.S. position has not changed: we continue to support Romanian membership in the MTCR.

--Australia, as the new MTCR Chair, will inform your government in more detail of the results of the Canberra Plenary.

12. (C) Cairo: Embassy Cairo should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary:

(C/RELEASABLE EGYPT)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes Egypt can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

13. (C) Hong Kong (for Hong Kong SAR Authorities): ConGen Hong Kong should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary to Hong Kong officials:

(C/RELEASABLE HONG KONG)

--The United States is providing this information as part of our commitment to keep Hong Kong informed of developments in the MTCR and to assist you in maintaining effective export controls.

--The United States believes Hong Kong can continue to make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

14. (C) Hong Kong (for Macau SAR Authorities): ConGen Hong Kong should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary to Macau officials:

(C/RELEASABLE MACAU)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls, with non-members.

--The United States believes Macau can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

15. (C) Islamabad: Embassy Islamabad should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary to Pakistani officials:

(C/RELEASABLE PAKISTAN)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States welcomes the positive steps made by Pakistan to date to strengthen its export controls, including the establishment of SECDIV. We encourage Pakistan to build on these positive actions.

--The United States believes Pakistan can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so.

--We also would like to express our interest in re-engaging in nonproliferation talks with your government at the earliest opportunity. This forum would be a useful venue for discussing issues like export controls and to explore how we may better cooperate to prevent proliferation globally.

--Australia, as the new MTCR Chair, will inform your government in more detail of the results of the Canberra Plenary.

16. (C) Kuala Lumpur: Embassy Kuala Lumpur should make the following additional points when presenting the non-paper on the Canberra MTCR Plenary to Malaysian officials:

(C/RELEASABLE MALAYSIA)

--At the MTCR Plenary in Canberra, the Regime agreed that it is important to discuss MTCR and missile nonproliferation issues with non-members, particularly the Regime's activities and objectives and the importance of implementing effective missile export controls.

--The United States believes Malaysia can make an important contribution to international missile nonproliferation efforts by adhering to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex; refraining from missile-related cooperation with programs of concern; and vigorously enforcing controls on missile-related exports, transits, transshipments, and brokering. We strongly encourage you to do so. --
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7. (C) However, conservative religious leaders downplayed claims of a Taliban presence in Quetta. Maulana Noor Mohammed, a former National Assembly member and leader of the religious party Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-F (JUI-F), rejected claims of a Taliban presence in the city. Maulana Noor Mohammed, a cleric reputedly sympathetic to the Taliban position, denied Taliban presence in Quetta, claiming that the accusation was promulgated by nationalist groups to alarm the public.

8. (C) Comment: Given its proximity to the Afghan border and the long history of conflict and religious fundamentalism in the area, there is almost certainly a Taliban presence in both northern Balochistan and in its capital city, Quetta. Nonetheless, ethnic bias could exaggerate some accusations and raise the potential for more violent conflict (ref A). The native Baloch have felt increasingly threatened by the growing Pashtun population, many of whom are refugees from Afghanistan or northern Pakistan. Tribal leaders in the tightly knit Baloch society have vigorously resisted any usurpation of their authority by outsiders, especially Pashtuns. This could make it particularly difficult for relatively new groups, like the Taliban, to consolidate any control in the province.

9. (C) Secular Baloch-nationalists have repeatedly accused the GOP of supporting Pashtun religious extremists to counter their often violent struggle for autonomy and control over natural resources (ref B). Ultimately, countering their influence among Balochistan's impoverished and largely illiterate population will require significant improvements in health care, education and economic opportunities. End Comment. FAKAN