Wikileaks - MCCCLXXV
211553 6/11/2009 17:54 09STATE60334 Secretary of State SECRET 09MADRID514 VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #0334 1621816 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 111754Z JUN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 0000 INFO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0000 S E C R E T STATE 060334
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2029 TAGS: KNNP, PARM, IAEA, MNUC, IR, SYR, TRGY SUBJECT: IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA
REF: MADRID 514
Classified by: ISN - C. S. Eliot Kang, Reasons 1.4(b),(d)
1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraphs 6-10.
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SUMMARY
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2. (SBU) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General (DG) ElBaradei released his latest reports on the status of the IAEA's investigations into Iran and Syria's nuclear programs on 5 June 2009. Both reports conformed to expectations in describing the absence of any meaningful steps by either country to address the serious issues that exist with respect to their nuclear programs.
3. (SBU) The activities described in the DG's latest Iran report underscore Iran's continued defiance of its international obligations and its progress toward a nuclear weapons capability. DG ElBaradei notes that Iran is now enriching uranium using approximately 5,000 centrifuges (up from nearly 4,000 centrifuges in March 2009), testing an additional 2,000 centrifuges, continuing to install new centrifuge cascades, and proceeding with research and development work on advanced centrifuge designs. Even more troubling, Iran has produced over 1,300 kilograms of low enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6). This is sufficient material for one nuclear weapon, were Iran to enrich it further to weapons-grade.
4. (SBU) At the same time, the report notes, Iran has refused even to meet to discuss the IAEA's outstanding questions regarding its past efforts to develop a nuclear warhead. Nor has Iran accepted the full implementation of safeguards, including access to the Arak reactor, which ElBaradei stresses "could adversely impact the Agency's ability to carry out effective safeguards at that facility." ElBaradei concludes with a request to Iran to cooperate with the IAEA without further delay.
5. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's report on Syria reinforces our conclusion that Syria was engaged in a clandestine effort to construct and operate a nuclear reactor at Al Kibar. It also highlights the litany of fruitless attempts by the IAEA to solicit additional information and clarifications from Syria. The list of unanswered questions appears to be growing. The IAEA notes in this report that it detected traces of chemically-processed uranium in the hot cells of Syria's declared Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus. Like the uranium found at Al Kibar, these traces do not match uranium in Syria's declared nuclear material inventory. According to the report, the Agency is conducting further analysis to determine a possible connection between the uranium detected at the MNSR and that detected at the Al Kibar site. The presence of additional, unexplained particles of uranium in Syria is a potential source of concern and could indicate more widespread undeclared nuclear activities in the country. These particles also reinforce the IAEA's assessment that the particles at Al Kibar were not introduced by Israeli munitions, as Syria maintains, though the IAEA also notes that further Israeli cooperation in this regard would be helpful.
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Action Requests
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6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS: Posts are requested to convey U.S. views regarding the IAEA reports to appropriate host government officials. Posts should underscore that these reports demonstrate that neither Iran nor Syria has taken any meaningful step to cooperate with the IAEA since the last report was issued in February 2009. Posts should stress that while Iran has stalled the IAEA's investigation and still refuses to provide the IAEA with requested transparency, its centrifuge program continues to make progress. The net result is that for both cases the international community continues to lack confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of these nuclear programs. For Iran, the UN Security Council has imposed a mandatory requirement that Iran suspend specified proliferation sensitive nuclear activities [those are: (1) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and (2) work on all heavy-water related projects. See UNSCR 1737 OP 2.] and cooperate fully with the IAEA. We believe that Iran's failure to do so yet again is another opportunity lost. With respect to Syria, Posts should emphasize that that Syria's ongoing refusal to cooperate with the Agency deepens concerns regarding the nature and extent of its clandestine nuclear activities, particularly in light of new findings of chemically- processed uranium at a declared nuclear facility in Damascus.
7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS EXCEPT LONDON, PARIS, BERLIN, MOSCOW, BEIJING CONT: With respect to the upcoming 15-19 June IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Posts should stress the need for the following from host governments:
-- Strong national statements on Iran and Syria to demonstrate unity in the Board in demanding Iran and Syria immediately comply with their international obligations. Statements should underscore the need for full transparency with the IAEA (including Iran's implementation of the Additional Protocol) and cooperation with the IAEA's investigation, as well as suspension of all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Statements should also highlight the degree to which both Iran and Syria have refused to cooperate with the IAEA by listing the unanswered questions noted in the Agency's reports; and,
-- Strengthened statements on Iran and Syria from regional or other groups, e.g., European Union, the Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean; the Africa Group, etc. To the extent possible, Posts should encourage host governments to instruct their delegations not to accept statements from any group to which they are a member that would downplay the factual reports of the IAEA, or undercut the Agency's ability to obtain the necessary information and access needed to resolve these serious issues.
8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR LONDON, PARIS, BERLIN, MOSCOW, BEIJING CONT: P5+1 posts should draw on paragraph 7 points to encourage host governments to deliver strong national statements on Syria. Posts should also note that we are pursuing a joint P5+1 statement on Iran. Such a statement would be negotiated among capitals.
9. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR MADRID: In addition to the above guidance, Post is requested to follow-up with the MFA officials who were briefed on Syria's clandestine nuclear activities on May 18 (See Reftel). Post should note that the discovery of additional traces of undeclared uranium at the MNSR in Damascus is yet another piece of evidence that Syria's clandestine nuclear activities went beyond the Al Kibar reactor. Post is also requested to strongly encourage Spain to give a strong national statement on Syria even if they are associated with an EU statement.
10. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR UNVIE: In addition to conveying these messages to local IAEA Missions, UNVIE should continue promoting support within the IAEA Secretariat and among IAEA Board Members for continuing and expanding the investigation into both Iran and Syria's nuclear activities and pressuring both to cooperate with the respective investigations. Mission is requested to place maximum effort into securing strong national statements demanding Iranian and Syrian cooperation with the IAEA by as many Board members as possible, particularly those in the EU. Mission should bear in mind that we continue to explore the possibility of a P5+1 joint statement regarding Iran, but would negotiate any such statement directly among capitals.
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POCS AND REPORTING DEADLINE
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11. (SBU) Posts are requested to report any substantive reactions at the earliest possible date. UNVIE is requested to report on the status of its efforts related to Iran and Syria in advance of the Board. Richard Nephew (202-647-7680) and Jim DeTemple (202-736-7930) are the Department's POCs for this issue. CLINTON
