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342 2/13/1990 16:26 90MOSCOW5204 Embassy Moscow CONFIDENTIAL R 131626Z FEB 90 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6874 INFO/RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1186 AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG AMCONSUL DURBAN AMEMBASSY HARARE C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 05204

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, UR, SF SUBJECT: MUTED SOVIET REACTION TO MANDELA\'S RELEASE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOR ALL THE ATTENTION THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE PAID TO NELSON MANDELA\'S RELEASE FEBRUARY 12, HE MIGHT AS WELL STILL BE IN PRISON. \"SEVEN DAYS\", THE USSR\'S MAJOR SUNDAY EVENING NEWS AND WEEK-IN-REVIEW PROGRAM, DEVOTED ALL OF THIRTY SECONDS TO THE EVENT, AND BURIED IT SOME FORTY MINUTES INTO THE PROGRAM -- AFTER SUCH HIGHLIGHTS AS UPCOMING LOCAL ELECTIONS IN SVERDLOVSK. \"PRAVDA\" (FEB. 12) LIKEWISE DEVOTED SCANT COVERAGE TO THE RELEASE, AND CARRIED ONLY A BIO SKETCH OF MANDELA, NEXT TO THE FAMILIAR 27-YEAR OLD PHOTO OF THE ANC LEADER WHEN HE WAS JAILED.

3. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW FEBRUARY 12, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YULIY VORONTSOV WAS ASKED ABOUT MANDELA\'S RELEASE AND WHETHER THIS WOULD PROMPT THE USSR TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. VORONTSOV RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WELCOMED MANDELA\'S RELEASE BY THE SAG. \"IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF HE HAD NOT BEEN IMPRISONED FOR 27 YEARS,\" VORONTSOV SAID IN THE ONLY FORCEFUL COMMENT WE HAVE HEARD ON THIS SUBJECT. MANDELA\'S RELEASE DID NOT YET MEAN THE SAG HAD DISMANTLED APARTHEID, HOWEVER. UNTIL THIS OCCURRED, THE WHOLE CIVILIZED WORLD -- INCLUDING THE USSR -- WOULD REFUSE TO HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, VORONTSOV SAID.

-- PRACTICE ARMED NEUTRALITY.

9. IN DEVELOPING THEIR NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS, THE HUNGARIANS WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD TRY TO MEET SOME SOVIET CONCERNS IN THE BILATERAL TREATY, THE GERMAN REP ADDED. AT THE SAME TIME, HUNGARY WOULD SEEK TIES BOTH WITH OVERALL WESTERN ORGANIZATIONS LIKE NATO AND THE EC AS WELL AS SMALLER REGIONAL GROUPS LIKE THE PENTAGONALE. WHILE THEY RECOGNIZED THAT, IN SOME CASES, THESE GROUPS DID NOT HAVE A SECURITY PURPOSE, HUNGARY DID BELIEVE MEMBERSHIP IN A NUMBER OF GROUPS WITH WESTERN TIES AIDED THEIR SECURITY. THE HUNGARIANS, UNLIKE THE POLES, TRIED NOT LIKE TO USE THE TERM SECURITY VACUUM BECAUSE IT IMPLIED THAT THERE WERE DISADVANTAGES TO THE END OF THE WARSAW PACT, WHILE THE HUNGARIANS CLEARLY SAW THE END OF THE PACT AS A NET SECURITY BENEFIT. HUNGARY ALSO WANTED TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN ANY PAN EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS.

10. THE UK REP NOTED THAT THE MORE THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES REDEFINED THEIR SECURITY THE MORE IT APPEARED TO ISOLATE THE SOVIET UNION. ALLIES HAD RECOGNIZED THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THIS PROCESS, AND THE SOVIETS WOULD USE THESE WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR ISOLATION TO LIMIT THE WEST AND SPECIFICALLY NATO TIES TO EASTERN EUROPE. THE POLES, DURING BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE MINISTER HOGG\'S TRIP TO WARSAW, WERE AWARE OF THE SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THEY REMAINED INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING TIES INCLUDING MILITARY LINKS TO NATO. THEY RECOGNIZED THAT MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT POSSIBLE NOW BUT DID NOT WANT TO RULE IT OUT AS AN ULTIMATE EVENTUALITY, EITHER.

BILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE SOVIETS
-----------------------------------
11. THE GERMAN REP NOTED THAT AS PART OF LOOKING FOR NEW SECURITY RELATIONS, THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE WILLING TO SIGN NEW TREATIES WITH MOSCOW. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE NOTED THAT DURING THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER\'S VISIT THERE, THE MINISTER HAD INITIALED THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN BILATERAL TREATY. WHILE THE TEXT HAD NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC ITS CONTENTS WERE OF HIGH INTEREST BECAUSE IT WOULD BE THE MODEL FOR TREATIES WITH THE OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES. IN FACT THE SOVIETS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED THESE TREATIES, WHICH WERE TO REPLACE THE WP AND THE BILATERAL SECURITY TREATIES UNDER IT, TO BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME FOR ALL THE FORMER WP ALLIES.

12. THE GERMAN REP REPORTED THAT THEIR EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW AND BUCHAREST BOTH AGREED THAT THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN TREATY CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING SECURITY CLAUSES:

--COMMITMENTS BY BOTH NOT TO JOIN ALLIANCES DIRECTED AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY;

--COMMITMENTS NOT TO LET THEIR TERRITORIES BE USED TO WAGE WAR AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY;

--COMMITMENTS NOT TO PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE OR OTHER SUPPORT TO STATES WAGING WAR AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY;

--AGREEMENT TO BASE THEIR SECURITY ON THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER;

--AGREEMENT TO INFORM EACH OTHER OF A PERCEIVED THREAT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SECURITIES;

--AGREEMENT ON IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS IN THE CASE OF AGGRESSION AGAINST EITHER PARTY.

13. THE GERMAN REP SAID THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KVITSINSKY HAD DEFENDED THE TREATY AS A SIGN OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS AND NOT AN ATTEMPT TO REVIVE THE PACT. THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT THE ERA OF MILITARY PACTS WAS OVER AND CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT ITS EVENTUAL EVOLUTION WOULD BE THE END OF NATO AS WELL.

14. THE GERMAN REP ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE CLAUSES IN THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN TREATY WENT WELL BEYOND ANY WHICH BONN ANTICIPATED OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT. HE NOTED THAT UNTIL THE INITIALING OF THE ROMANIAN TREATY, THE SOVIET/HUNGARIAN AGREEMENT WAS THOUGHT TO BE FARTHEST ADVANCED. ANTALL WAS EXPECTED TO GO TO MOSCOW TO SIGN IT AT THE END OF APRIL. HOWEVER, THE GERMAN REP INDICATED THAT HUNGARY WOULD AS SOON HAVE NO TREATY AS SIGN A TREATY WITH SUCH FAR REACHING CLAUSES.

15. THE U.S. REP SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY SURPRISED WITHTHE CONTENT OF THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN TREATY WHICH HIS GERMAN COLLEAGUEHAD DESCRIBED. DRAWING ON REFTEL, HE AGREED THAT OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES WERE UNLIKELY TO BE WILLING TO GO AS FAR, AND NOTED THAT AS MUCH AS 25 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET/HUNGARIAN TREATY REMAINED BRACKETED. FROM REFTEL, HE DESCRIBED THE SOVIET INTEREST IN THIS NEW GENERATION OF TREATIES AND THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD ALL BE SIMILAR AND WOULD BRING SOME OF THE FORMER WARSAW PACT GUARANTEES AND CONSULTATIONS INTO THE NEW RELATIONS.

16. THIS EXCHANGE LED TO A VIGOROUS DISCUSSION AS TO WHY THE ROMANIANS HAD ACCEPTED SUCH CLAUSES AND WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE ON OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE SPANISH REP NOTED ROMANIA, BUT ALSO BULGARIA\'S SHAKY ECONOMIES WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE DUTCH REP AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEW BILATERAL TREATIES AND SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD EFFECT THE ENTIRE PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION. HE ALSO REMINDED THE COMMITTEE THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR AFANASSIEVSKY HAD PROPOSED TO THE SYG THAT NATO \"ENDORSE\" IN SOME WAY THESE \"SECURITY\" CLAUSES IN THE NEW BILATERAL TREATIES. IF THEY WENT AS FAR AS THE ROMANIAN TREATY APPARENTLY DID, THAT WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE. AND IN ANY CASE, NATO SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS INTERFERING IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THESE TREATIES.

17. THE FRENCH REP SAID THAT SHE AGREED THESE NEW SECURITY TREATIES WERE AN IMPORTANT NEW FACTOR AND NATO SHOULD FOLLOW THEIR DEVELOPMENT CLOSELY. IT WOULD, SHE SUGGESTED, BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO INCLUDE THE CONCEPTS IN THESE TREATIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

18. PAPER CIRCULATED (COPY FAXED TO EUR/RPM).

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION

--VISIT TO POLAND BY MR. HOGG, MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 17-19 MARCH 1991.

KORNBLUM