Wikileaks - CMXVIII
137564 1/16/2008 15:18 08STATE4865 Secretary of State SECRET 08STATE150164 VZCZCXRO3899 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHC #4865/01 0161520 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 161518Z JAN 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 8736 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 5771 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 6900 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 8103 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0011 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 8392 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 7870 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 5072 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4419 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 7302 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 9333 RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 9270 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 7784 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5952 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 7574 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 4297 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0280 RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 6596 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 5372 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 6541 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0596 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2345 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 5512 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 9014 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 9791 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 4815 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0042 INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 004865
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2033 TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, IZ SUBJECT: SECOND SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
REF: STATE 150164
Classified By: NEA DAS LAWRENCE BUTLER FOR REASONS 1.4. (A), (B) AND (D)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see Para 3. Please slug responses for PM, NEA and the appropriate regional bureau; also info NSC WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC, and JOINT STAFF WASHDC.
2. (C) SUMMARY: As the President and Prime Minister Maliki agreed in their November 26, 2007 Declaration of Principles, "the Governments of Iraq and the United States are committed to developing a long-term relationship as two fully sovereign and independent states with common interests." UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1790 takes note of the Iraqi Prime Minister,s December 7 letter to the Security Council in which he stated that the Government of Iraq considers the letter to be its final request to the Security Council for the extension of the mandate of the multinational force. The United States is beginning a dialogue with Iraq on a long-term relationship, including defining the conditions for and status of a military presence in Iraq in 2009 and thereafter.
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OBJECTIVES
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3. (C) Posts are requested to engage host governments in order to determine whether host governments expect to pursue continued troop deployments in Iraq in 2009, and what legal and political conditions the host government believes would be necessary to facilitate such deployments without the authority of a Chapter VII UNSCR. Posts should also inquire as to what conditions would be useful but not absolutely necessary to facilitate a continued presence. Posts should note if the foreign policy and defense establishments differ in their assessment of the legal or political hurdles. Post should also note the role that the legislature will have and the anticipated lead time required to take any required domestic steps (e.g., legislation) to obtain authority to remain in Iraq post-Chapter VII UNSCR. Finally, post should explore whether the host government would be interested in benefiting as a third-party from a U.S.-Iraq Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), as described below.
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BACKGROUND
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4. (C) The U.S. preferred outcome is that if foreign governments will be able to deploy to Iraq in 2009 and beyond, they will be able to benefit from the same status arrangements and authorizations that U.S. forces will have under a to-be-negotiated Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The mechanism we have in mind currently to provide such benefits is to include a term in the U.S.-Iraq DCA that extends to a troop-contributing country, upon such country,s request, the rights and obligations of specific articles in the DCA. We do not/not anticipate that this will be a multi-lateral agreement. We will brief international partners on our discussions with Iraq on the DCA in the near future.
STATE 00004865 002 OF 003
5. (U) A Fact Sheet that discusses the role of security in a Strategic Framework Agreement is repeated in para. 6 for posts to draw on in the discussion. Posts should not/not leave this factsheet as a nonpaper--note that the exact name of the agreement is still to be determined
6. (SBU)
BEGIN EXCERPTS SPECIFIC TO THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
-- negotiations will begin by addressing issues of security and center on the framework for U.S. support to and cooperation with the Iraqi government.
-- This security agreement would be very similar in content to status of forces agreements or defense cooperation agreements(DCA) that the U.S. negotiates regionally and globally. The U.S. has concluded similar arrangements with more than 120 countries around the world, including many countries in the region. We generally seek to negotiate these agreements anywhere U.S. forces will be present in a peacetime environment, and to cover all manner of cooperative military activities.
-- An agreement with Iraq would include provisions that are not found in traditional DCAs, such as temporary authorities for United States forces to continue to conduct operations in Iraq and to hold security detainees. Other topics typically addressed in most DCAs include the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over U.S. DOD personnel, cooperation in criminal investigations; entry/exit and tax exemptions, access to host nation, government-owned facilities, and adjudication of claims, among others.
-- When concluded, such an agreement with Iraq, as with all such agreements that the U.S. concludes with its friends and allies, will respect the sovereignty of our host, preserve flexibility for U.S. national decision makers, and provide the necessary freedom of action for U.S. forces. This is not an attempt to lock down future administrations into certain policies, troop levels, or mission sets, but instead to negotiate the legal framework for the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
-- We hope troop-contributing countries will continue to contribute to the common goal of helping Iraq provide for its security, and as part of our efforts to negotiate this agreement, we will work to facilitate this. Our relationship with Iraq is evolving, but Iraq still requires a range of support and training before it can take full responsibility for its own security.
-- The Iraqi government has indicated that it does not want permanent U.S. bases in Iraq, and we are not seeking them. As is commonplace in bilateral DCAs, the U.S. and Iraq will negotiate topics such as access to facilitites in order to promote our mutual goals and interests.
-- The USG has about 120 DCAs or similar agreements with countries around the world and, with the exception of those agreements that involve reciprocal obligations or include an explicit defense commitment (e.g. NATO Status of Forces Agreement, Mutual Defense Agreements with Japan and Korea), DCAs are concluded as executive agreements.
END FACT SHEET EXCERPTS
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REPORTING DEADLINE
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7. (U) Posts should respond by Wednesday January 24.
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POINT OF CONTACT
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8. (U) Please contact NEA/I-PM's Stephen Epstein: 202-647- 4112; EpsteinSM@state.sgov.gov. RICE
