Wikileaks - CMLXXIX
143744 2/29/2008 16:33 08KHARTOUM297 Embassy Khartoum CONFIDENTIAL 08KHARTOUM278 VZCZCXRO1618 OO RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0297/01 0601633 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291633Z FEB 08 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0067 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0294 RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 000297
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KPAO, PTER, SU, CD SUBJECT: S/E WILLIAMSON'S SECOND MEETING WITH NAFIE ALI NAFIE, SENIOR NCP OFFICIALS
REF: KHARTOUM 00278
KHARTOUM 00000297 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
Sudanese Participants: Nafie Ali Nafie, Assistant to the President Mustafa Osman Ismail, Advisor to the President Saeed Al Khatib, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies Yehia Babiker, Member of the Joint National Transition Team Hassan Haj Ali, NCP Advisor Abdelbasit Sounousi, Director of the Americas Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mauwia Al Tom, Counselor at the Americas Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
USG Participants: Richard Williamson, Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan Alberto Fernandez, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Khartoum Cameron Hudson, NSC Director for Africa Jana Chapman-Gates, Senior Advisor to the Special Envoy Col. Dennis Giddens, Sudan Country Director, Office of the *Secretary* of Defense Notetaker: Payton Knopf, U.S. Embassy Khartoum
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) President Bush has an "intense interest" in alleviating humanitarian suffering and bringing stability to Sudan, S/E Williamson told Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie and other senior Sudanese officials on February 29. He informed Nafie that the U.S. has decided to respond to President Bashir's overture to discuss an improvement in the bilateral relationship and presented a draft USG work plan of specific and verifiable actions that the U.S. expected from Sudan. He suggested that Khartoum prepare a written response within one week and that he then meet with a Sudanese team appointed by President Bashir to continue the discussion. "If three weeks from today we still don't have an agreement on a basic platform to go forward, I don't think we have much chance of making progress," predicted S/E Williamson, who also cautioned that an explosion of violence in Chad will derail the dialogue. The Special Envoy suggested that both governments work to avoid both raising expectations and "needless provocation."
2. (C) Summary continued: In response to a request from Ismail during his trip to Washington, S/E Williamson also presented Nafie with a paper detailing the process for rescinding the state sponsor of terrorism designation, though cautioned that it involved both political and legal steps. S/E Williamson underscored that any dialogue be business-like and in the interests of both governments. "If I hear a litany of history, I will listen for half an hour and then describe to you the inhumanity that has occurred in Sudan," he said. Nafie pledged to take S/E Williamson's initiative seriously and accepted the timeline. He claimed that peace and stability in Chad is in the interests of Sudan. S/E Williamson is scheduled to meet President Bashir later on February 29. End summary.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
U.S. Interests: Alleviating Suffering, Bringing Stability
--------------------------------------------- ------------
3. (C) President Bush has an "intense interest" in improving the humanitarian situation and increasing stability in Sudan, S/E Williamson said during a two-hour meeting with Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie and senior Sudanese officials in Khartoum on February 29. In recent discussions with Foreign Minister Deng Alor and Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail in Washington, Secretary Rice indicated that the USG is prepared to pursue President Bashir's overture to improve the bilateral relationship in an effort to achieve U.S. policy goals in Sudan, according to S/E Williamson. His current visit to Sudan is a step in this process. "My only interest is, as the President has defined it, to alleviate humanitarian suffering and to bring a more stable environment in Darfur and along the North/South border," said the Special Envoy.
---------------
Draft Work Plan
---------------
KHARTOUM 00000297 002.2 OF 005
4. (C) S/E Williamson presented Nafie with a draft USG work plan, explaining that it contained specific and verifiable actions that the U.S. expected from Sudan, including steps that will save civilian lives. He invited the Sudanese Government to respond to the draft in writing within one week listing their own expectations, and he indicated that submission of Sudan's response should be followed one week later with a meeting between S/E Williamson and senior Sudanese representatives selected by President Bashir. S/E Williamson emphasized that he sought a mechanism where, once there is an agreed work plan, both envoys report to their respective Presidents and serve as "the final check" of accountability that each government is fulfilling its commitments.
5. (C) The draft work plan is not a "take it or leave it document," said S/E Williamson, adding that while the U.S. is "adamant" about some elements, it is open to consideration of Sudan's legitimate concerns. He stipulated that a firm, unambiguous plan crystallize in the next two to three weeks. "If three weeks from today we still don't have an agreement on a basic platform to go forward, I don't think we have much chance of making progress," said S/E Williamson.
6. (C) Noting that he will not be surprised if Sudan decided it is not in its interest to continue a focused dialogue, S/E Williamson nonetheless said that he "is looking forward to an informed reply" and remained "cautiously optimistic that this provides the best opportunity between now and the next administration." "It's up to Sudan if it wants to take the first step and dance or sit back down at its seat," said the Envoy.
--------------------------------------------- - Warning: Chad Violence Will Derail Discussions
--------------------------------------------- -
7. (C) The Special Envoy reiterated a statement he made during his earlier meeting with Nafie on February 25 that any new explosion of violence in Chad could derail U.S.-Sudan dialogue (reftel). "If we're moving to re-calibrate a complex relationship between the Government of Sudan and the United States, it cannot be divorced from Chad," argued S/E Williamson. Acknowledging that Chad's behavior would need to change as well, he said that the USG is allocating greater resources to monitor the activities of Deby's regime.
-----------------------
Discrete Public Posture
-----------------------
8. (C) While he will not take any actions that he is uncomfortable defending, S/E Williamson said that public scrutiny of the U.S.-Sudan dialogue at present will put both governments at the mercy of internal pressures, which will drain their energy to advance the process. Sudan and the U.S. should avoid raising expectations--such as Foreign Minister Deng Alor's February 25 statement indicating a normalization of relations in four to six months--as well as "needless provocation," he posited.
--------------------------------------------- --- Terrorism Designation: Political and Legal Steps
--------------------------------------------- ---
9. (C) In response to a request from Ismail during his trip to Washington, S/E Williamson also presented Nafie with a paper detailing the process for rescinding the state sponsor of terrorism designation. He emphasized that the process involved both political and legal steps, including a 45-day Congressional notification period. S/E Williamson predicted that there would be significant public discussion in the U.S. if President Bush decided to pursue that course of action.
-------------------------------------------
Nafie: U.S. Initiative in Sudan's Interests
-------------------------------------------
10. (C) "We are going to take this initiative very seriously," said Nafie, "and it is in all of our interests." For the effort to succeed, Nafie concurred that both sides should be clear on the intricacies of any agreement. He accepted both the mechanism for a second focal point in each government and the timeline proposed by S/E Williamson--"unless both sides agreed to adjust it"--and said that Sudan would "point out what we want clarified and what
KHARTOUM 00000297 003.2 OF 005
we'll accept" in the work plan. Nafie also committed Sudan to abide by the discrete public approach suggested by S/E Williamson.
------------------------------------
Sudan Wants Peace, Stability in Chad
------------------------------------
11. (C) Nafie said that the Sudanese Government had "no special interest" in a replacement for Deby and believed that peace and stability in Chad was in Khartoum's interests. While Sudan remained ready "to deal, to talk" to the Chadian government on a bilateral basis, Nafie said that Deby should begin "to act like a head of state rather than the head of the Zaghawa."
-------------------------
-- INITIAL DISMAY AT THE CONTENTS OF THE PROPOSAL. WHAT MACEDONIA NEEDED, HE SAID, WAS "A HELPING HAND, NOT ARM TWISTING." NATO'S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES, MILOSOSKI CONTINUED, "SHOULD NOT BE CORRUPTED BY ONE OF ITS MEMBERS." MACEDONIA DID NOT WANT TO BE PART OF A CAMPAIGN TO SAVE PM KARAMANLIS'S GOVERNMENT FROM FALLING. THE US, HE SAID, COULD USE ITS LEVERAGE WITH GREECE BY THREATENING, FOR EXAMPLE, TO JOIN TURKEY'S FOOTNOTE ON NATO DOCUMENTS IF ATHENS WIELDED ITS VETO.
6. (C) THE CHARGE REITERATED THAT THE USG'S GOAL OF A NATO ENLARGEMENT THAT INCLUDED MACEDONIA REMAINED UNCHANGED, AND NOTED THAT WE WERE WORKING IN BRUSSELS AND IN OTHER ALLIED CAPITALS TO PREVENT A GREEK VETO. ALTHOUGH GREECE HAS THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE 1995 INTERIM ACCORD, THE THREAT OF A VETO IS REAL. WE WANTED TO EXTEND A HELPING HAND TO SKOPJE, NOT TWIST ARMS, IN ORDER TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE NAME ISSUE. BUT MACEDONIA HAD TO BE FLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATING, AND HAD TO STAY ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS, IN ORDER FOR US TO BEST BE ABLE TO PERSUADE ALL NATO ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY GREECE, TO SUPPORT AN INVITATION.
NEXT STEPS -- EXPECTING A GREEK VETO
7. (C) MILOSOSKI SAID THE GOM WOULD WAIT FOR NAME NEGOTIATOR AMBASSADOR DIMITROV TO REPORT BACK FROM THE TALKS ON THE NIMETZ PROPOSAL THAT WERE TAKING PLACE ON FEBRUARY 29 IN NEW YORK. THE PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENT, AND MAIN POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS WOULD THEN MEET TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS. THE OPPOSITION, HE CLAIMED, ALREADY HAD ACCUSED PM GRUEVSKI OF HAVING "COMMITTED TREASON" FOR HAVING AGREED TO A COMPOSITE NAME FOR INTERNATIONAL USE. (COMMENT: AN OPPOSITION LEADER DID/DID LEVEL A TREASON ACCUSATION AGAINST GRUEVSKI'S MINISTER OF INTERIOR, BUT NOT AGAINST GRUEVSKI, AND THE CHARGE WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MINISTER'S ALLEGED MISHANDLING OF A PRO-NAME PROTEST IN SKOPJE. END COMMENT.)
8. (C) MILOSOSKI SAID THE GOM EXPECTED PM KARAMANLIS TO VETO, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, EVEN IF THE TWO SIDES REACHED AN AGREEMENT IN THE NAME TALKS. THAT WOULD ALLOW KARAMANLIS TO PAINT FM BAKOYANNIS'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE AS A FAILURE, STRENGTHENING THE GREEK PM'S POLITICAL HAND. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD EITHER REACH AN AGREEMENT, OR AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE, BEFORE THE APRIL NATO SUMMIT. THE CHARGE URGED CONTINUED MACEDONIAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE NIMETZ PROCESS, AND SUGGESTED SKOPJE WORK TO SHAPE THE DIRECTION OF THE TALKS BY PUTTING FORWARD WHAT IT COULD ACCEPT IN THE NIMETZ PROPOSAL AND NEGOTIATING ON THE POINTS IT FINDS PROBLEMATIC. EVEN IF A FINAL AGREEMENT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BEFORE BUCHAREST, REAL PROGRESS OR AN "AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE" COULD POSSIBLY PERSUADE GREECE TO LIFT ITS VETO THREAT. MILOSOSKI REPLIED THAT THE MACEDONIANS WERE "OPTIMISTS," BUT WOULD NOT "ALLOW OUR PRAGMATISM TO BE USED TO PAY FOR THE POLITICAL MISTAKES OF OUR GREEK NEIGHBORS."
COMMENT
9. (C) FROM MILOSOSKI'S DESCRIPTION, THE GOM APPEARS RESIGNED TO A GREEK VETO. HOWEVER, PRIME MINISTER GRUEVSKI REMAINS THE PRIMARY DECISION MAKER. THE LACK OF ANY APPRECIABLE PROGRESS IN THE NIMETZ TALKS IN NEW YORK OVER THE MARCH 1-2 WEEKEND LIKELY HAS FURTHER REINFORCED MACEDONIAN FATALISM ABOUT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS, AND THUS THE COUNTRY'S NATO PROSPECTS. WE WILL CONTINUE PRESSING FOR MACEDONIAN FLEXIBILITY AND ENGAGEMENT, BUT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S FIRM, PUBLIC VETO THREATS ARE HAVING THE EFFECT HERE OF HARDENING RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA OF MAKING COMPROMISES THAT MIGHT PERSUADE GREECE TO LIFT ITS VETO THREAT. NAVRATIL
