Wikileaks - CM
133606 12/10/2007 16:30 07ROME2452 Embassy Rome CONFIDENTIAL 07STATE133921 VZCZCXRO7942 PP RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #2452/01 3441630 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 101630Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9525 INFO RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2793 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 9134 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2939 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ROME 002452
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
S/CT FOR KEN MCKUNE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2017 TAGS: KVPR, PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, CVIS, ASEC, KHLS, IT SUBJECT: ITALY: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING
REF: STATE 133921
Classified By: A/POL M/C Jonathan R. Cohen, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (SBU) The following are Embassy Rome's answers to the questionnaire on host government information collection, screening and sharing practices contained in Reftel.
2. (SBU) Section A: Watchlisting
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Question: If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many records does the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related?
Answer: The Government of Italy (GOI) does not maintain a consolidated terrorist watchlist shared by all agencies. However, the Ministry of the Interior's National Police (Polizia di Stato) maintain a watchlist/database that includes names associated with criminal and terrorist activities. The National Gendarmerie (Carabinieri), Financial Police (Guardia di Finanza), Border Police and others input data into the National Police database. This information generally includes prior arrests, convictions, wanted persons, including those subjects of investigations that have reached the point of an active judicial investigation (under the authority of a prosecutor). In the case of active terrorism investigations, the investigating authority is mandated to disseminate the information to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. It is not known how many entries in the database are terrorist-related, as some listings may fall under multiple headings, not all of which fit the definition of terrorism. Border control officials also use the Schengen database, which serves to identify fugitives or individuals who are not admissible to the Schengen area.
Q: Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist?
A: National Police (Ministry of the Interior).
3. (SBU) Section B: Traveler Information Collection
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Q: What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in the country?
A: Non-EU citizens arriving in Italian territory have to fill out a series of information forms at customs and police controls. Non-EU citizens are also subject to screening for admission to the Schengen area (see below).
Q: Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry and for domestic flights?
A: There are no substantial differences regarding data collected at different ports of entry (terrestrial, maritime or airports). However, as a result of the events of 9/11, Schengen regulations state that all airlines flying into a Schengen country must communicate to border police authorities the following data on passengers obtained during the check-in phase: a) number, type and expiry date of travel ID; b) Citizenship; c) Full name; d) Date and place of birth; e) Point of entry into Italy; f) Flight number, date of departure and arrival; g) Departure time and duration of the flight; h) Total number of passengers on the flight; and i) First point of embarkation.
Q: Who collects traveler information?
A: Depending upon the point of entry, either the operators of the transport service collect the information and pass it to administrative or police authorities, or the administrative or police authorities collect it themselves and enter it into the Schengen database. -- THE SUCCESS OF DEFENSE REFORM
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4. (C) Defense reform has been one of the greatest success stories of post-Dayton Bosnia. The US-led process successfully merged the two entity Ministry of Defenses and created a joint Armed Forces out of three formerly warring armies. External and internal observers alike have praised the creation of a unified, multi-ethnic Armed forces and single Ministry of Defense, both of which offer compelling evidence that functioning state-level institutions necessary for Euro-Atlantic integration can be created and sustained. In 2007, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces, under the leadership of Cikotic and CHOD LTG Sifet Podzic, reinvigorated a defense reform process that had stalled in the last half of 2006 while Bosnia was preoccupied with national elections. Most notably, by December 1, the two men had stood-up the Bosnian Armed Forces' new force structure.
DEFENSE PROPERTY A STICKING POINT; IMPACTS DEPLOYMENTS
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5. (C) While defense reform is unarguably a major success, it remains incomplete. Most importantly, the entities and state have yet to resolve defense property issues. In July 2007, the entity and state leaderships reached a political agreement on defense property that was to provide the basis for formal agreements that would transfer movable (arms, ammunition, vehicles, etc.) and immovable (land, bases) property from the entities to the state. Nearly a half year later, there has been little progress in finalizing a transfer agreement for either movable or immovable defense property. Recent actions by the RS government (Ref C) indicate that they are backing away from the commitments in the political agreement and seeking to maintain control over surplus arms and ammunition. This position is at odds with the political agreement signed by RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and raises profound concerns about RS intentions and commitments to principles laid down by NATO, OSCE and EUFOR 18 months ago that all weapons, ammunition and explosives would be transferred to the state. Minister Cikotic is particularly concerned about the apparent about face by the RS on defense property and will urge Washington to pressure Dodik to conclude an agreement consistent with the July 2007 political agreement as quickly as possible, which he will note is crucial to Bosnia's NATO aspirations and ability to deploy additional forces to Iraq. (Note. The Ambassador and High Representative Miroslav Lajcak are both making approaches to Dodik on this issue. End Note.)
NATO: CIKOTIC LOOKS FOR USG SUPPORT AT BUCHAREST
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6. (C) Bosnia has made significant, and perhaps unexpected, progress in its first year in PfP. The MOD and MFA have finished drafting Bosnia's first Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and hope to have it approved by the Council of Ministers, Presidency, and Parliament by mid-February 2008. Bosnia completed its first Partnership and Review Process (PARP) survey in September, which received a positive assessment from NATO's International Staff. In a time of increased political polarization here, the NATO agenda has been uncontentious: NATO membership continues to enjoy wide support among the political elite and general public alike (including a majority of the Bosnian Serb population, according to polling data).
SARAJEVO 00002648 003 OF 003
7. (C) Cikotic will seek to enlist USG support for accelerating Bosnia's integration with NATO during his visit to Washington. Cikotic has told us that he plans to hand-carry a letter from all three members of Bosnia's Tri-Presidency to Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice detailing Bosnia's substantial accomplishments on NATO and PfP activities and urging a positive assessment of Bosnia's efforts at NATO's Bucharest Summit. Cikotic has told us that he believes Bosnia should seek a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at Bucharest (with full membership by the 2010 NATO Summit), and he may bring up this idea in Washington. At the least, Cikotic will urge, Bosnia should be mentioned separately from the other new PfP members in the Bucharest Communique, and be offered an Intensified Dialogue. Cikotic views the accession process as a unifying issue for the country. He believes progress towards NATO membership will encourage the government to undertake further structural reforms that would improve the functionality of the state. In discussing the issue with Cikotic, we have counseled pragmatism, and urged him and the rest of the Bosnian government to embrace plans and a timetable for NATO accession that is ambitious but sustainable for Bosnian institutions.
COMMENT: AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW MUTUAL SUPPORT
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8. (C) Cikotic's visit to Washington comes at an opportune time considering the number of important items currently on our bilateral defense agenda. Cikotic should be told that the failure to resolve defense property will be negatively viewed at the Bucharest Summit-- a message he can take back to Bosnia and share with Prime Minister Spiric and the RS leadership. He should also be encouraged to continue Bosnia's support for the Iraq mission, and look to expand the deployment along the lines already proposed by the USG. On both of the issues Cikotic will be an ally, and he can use the message from senior Washington policymakers to help make the case back home. Cikotic views securing USG support for an accelerated timetable for Bosnia's NATO integration as the most important element of his trip. A positive message at Bucharest (de-linking Bosnia from Serbia and Montenegro in the communique and invitation to begin an Intensified Dialogue) would boost defense, and possibly the broader, reform agenda here and further our objective of anchoring Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic institutions. In Washington, we must be encouraging, and, without over-committing ourselves, provide Cikotic the leverage at home to bolster his strong leadership on defense reform and NATO accession. ENGLISH
