Wikileaks - CCCXLIX
67385 6/9/2006 11:46 06ANKARA3416 Embassy Ankara UNCLASSIFIED VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHAK #3416/01 1601146 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 091146Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6445 INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 2199 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 7254 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0655 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1383 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4129 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0311 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0062 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5322 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0877 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0225 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0043 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0255 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0213 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0221 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0211 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0723 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0210 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3020 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0407 RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0184 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5444 RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0067 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0202 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0236 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5245 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0139 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0055 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6549 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0020 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0182 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0066 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0040 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1236 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0929 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1576 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0044 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0199 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0095 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// UNCLAS ANKARA 003416
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM, PREL, TU SUBJECT: PSI; TURKISH HOSTS MAJOR PSI EXERCISE; ANATOLIAN SUN
1. Summary: Turkey hosted a major PSI exercise, Anatolian Sun '06, from May 24-26, 2006. This exercise was the first multidimensional PSI exercise, which combined land, maritime and air interdiction components. The aim of Anatolian Sun-06 exercise was to test and develop the information and intelligence exchange, consultation and political decision making processes along with the operational mechanisms at both national and multinational levels within the framework of PSI. Turkey extended invitations to sixty-seven (67) countries to participate or observe the exercise. IN addition to Turkey, three countries, US, France and Portugal, supplied operational assets to participate in the LIVEX portion of the exercise, while thirty-four (34) other countries sent delegations to observe. Turkey focused its outreach efforts on Central Asian and Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Sixteen different GOT agencies also participated, making the exercise particularly valuable in building interagency links that have traditionally been weak. Turkey did an outstanding job planning and executing a complex PSI exercise. Turkish officials' exuberance during the cargo inspection element may have overwhelmed some of the observers from smaller countries with less capabilities. Nonetheless, the exercise was very well organized, well attended, met many of the training objectives, and provided an outstanding opportunity for PSI outreach. End Summary.
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Exercise Background
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2. Turkey formally endorsed the PSI in December 2003. Turkey was welcomed as a member of the Operational Experts Group (OEG) and attended several exercises. At the April 2005 OEG meeting, Turkey announced that it would host a PSI exercise in the spring of 2006, Anatolian Sun. Anatolian Sun was the first PSI exercise hosted by Turkey. Furthermore, it was the first multidimensional PSI exercise that combined land, maritime and air interdiction components.
3. The aim of Anatolian Sun-06 exercise was to test and develop the information and intelligence exchange, consultation and political decision making processes along with the operational mechanisms at both national and multinational levels within the framework of PSI. The exercise was composed of two parts:
--Command Post Exercise (CPX) - The goal of this phase was to exercise Turkish crisis management centers and included participation of approx. 16 Turkish national institutions. Also, countries which participate in the OEG were provided access to the exercise web site to follow the progress of the exercise and participate as appropriate.
--Live Exercise (LIVEX) - This phase included the participation of naval ships and aircraft from Turkey, the United States, France and Portugal. The goal of this phase was the actual interdiction of a ship suspected of transporting WMD related materials out of Antalya Bay, Turkey.
4. The objectives outlined by the GOT for this exercise included:
-- Examining intelligence sharing procedures at national and international levels and identify problem areas.
-- Test and develop command, control, and operational capabilities in applying interdiction measures
-- Identify national legal authorities to effectively implement interdiction measures and make necessary arrangements in the legal structure; as well as identify areas to be developed in the political decisions-making process.
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Overview of Exercise
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5. Anatolian Sun '06 was based on a generic scenario, which did not target any specific country, and consisted of three main events which covered land, maritime, and air PSI interdiction measures. These three events were:
a) An air shipment of WMD related materials to Turkey and implementation of air interdiction measures. Interdiction of the suspect plane carrying WMD material was exercised during the CPX.
b) The interdiction of trucks transporting WMD related material at the customs screening location in Antalya. Information was provided to the GOT concerning two (2) trucks carrying WMD related materials which had successfully entered the southeastern portion of Turkey. The information exchange and truck-related interdiction operations were part of the CPX and the actual inspection of one of the trucks was conducted as part of the LIVEX.
c) As part of the LIVEX, a ship transporting WMD related material was interdicted outside of Antalya Bay. Intelligence information concerning one of the trucks showed that it had successfully passed its cargo to a ship in the Port of Antalya. The commercial ship departed port without authorization and was subsequently interdicted by PSI partners working in cooperation. This portion of the LIVEX also included the interdiction of a helicopter attempting to remove the material from the ship, by both shipboard helicopter and land based fixed wing assets, and the boarding and escort to port of the ship in question.
6. Observers of the exercise were hosted on a Turkish Navy ship throughout the at-sea portion of the exercise. Observers were kept up-to-date throughout the exercise via announcements over the ship's PA system. Once the exercise participants returned to the port, observers were led to a covered grandstand where they observed the actions of Turkish Customs, Atomic Energy Authority, police and other organizations as they carried out their duties.
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Live Exercise
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7. The LIVEX portion of the exercise began with the departure of a small freighter (M/V Sea Star) from the Port of Antalya with cargo suspected of containing WMD related material. Earlier in the morning four (4) surface combatant ships (one each from Turkey, US, France and Portugal) had begun a simulated NATO exercise off the coast of Antalya. The exercise was suspended and the four ships formed a PSI task force with the goal of intercepting the freighter. The 4 naval ships were assisted in their search by Maritime Patrol Aircraft from Turkey, France and the US. The M/V Sea Star was located and the naval ships interdicted the ship.
8. Following authorization from the flag state of the M/V Sea Star (in this case "yellow country"), boarding operations were conducted. Joint boarding operations utilizing operational assets from all participating nations were conducted in Turkish waters under the authority of Turkish officials. Once the boarding was completed, the M/V Sea Star was escorted back to port for a more thorough inspection of the ship and its cargo.
9. In port, the cargo was off loaded and inspected for biological, chemical and radiological hazards. The inspection of the cargo was done jointly by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, the Turkish Health Ministry and Turkish Customs. All individuals were outfitted with appropriate safety equipment and all internationally recognized safety procedures were followed. The containers were opened and the contents identified as WMD related materials.
10. As part of the shore-side activities, one of the trucks interdicted during the CPX phase of the exercise was inspected. Biological hazards were found and proper decontamination of the truck and personnel was conducted.
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International Outreach
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11. The Republic of Turkey extended invitations to sixty-seven (67) countries to participate or observe the Anatolian Sun Exercise. These countries included PSI endorsing countries and other nations that have shown interest in supporting PSI. Three countries, US, France and Portugal, supplied operational assets to participate in the LIVEX portion of the exercise in addition to Turkey. Thirty-four (34) other countries sent delegations to observe the exercise. In coordination with the United States, Turkey focused its outreach efforts on Central Asian and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, encouraging their attendance at the exercise.
12. The following countries sent observers to the Anatolian Sun exercise:
--Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
13. The following countries were invited to attend but for various reasons did not send a delegation to the exercise: -- Afghanistan, Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Morocco, Norway, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, and UAE.
14. The GOT repeatedly reinforce the message that no specific country was the target of this PSI exercise. This was particularly evident following publication of the May 22 New York Times article, "U.S. Exercise With Turkey is Aimed at Iran". The scenario included generic activities in the movement of WMD related materials which would allow exercise participants and observers to develop a set of lessons learned to improve their own capabilities.
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Impression of Exercise
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15. The LIVEX was, by all accounts, a complete success. All aspects of the vessel boarding, vessel escort and container inspections were completed without incident or injury and provided good at-sea training for the involved assets.
16. It was apparent to veteran exercise observers that the LIVEX was well planned and choreographed. The LIVEX timeline was adhered to very closely and it was apparent that the Turks left nothing to chance.
17. The Turks did an outstanding job of hosting over 100 people from 37 countries. The exercise control team kept the observers engaged in all aspects of the LIVEX by making periodic announcements of events as they unfolded and explained what authorities enabled their actions.
18. The inspection and decontamination of the cargo container and personnel were consistent with internationally recognized standards. While observing this was routine for exercise veterans from long-standing PSI endorsees, this was an important part for delegations getting their first exposure to PSI.
19. We have discussed the exercise with different officials within the Turkish government. The overall impression was the exercise was very useful in displaying the large amount of interministerial coordination that is required should Turkey be required to react to this type of situation. This was the first major exercise which required a number of Turkish Ministries to have to work together. Not accustomed to working together the individual learning that was achieved by many slowed the exercise at times. However, this experience will better prepare Turkey should it be faced with these situations in the future.
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Comments
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20. Anatolian Sun was one of the most robust PSI exercises conducted to date. The exercise included a distributed CPX involving a large number of Turkish ministries (over 1,800 GOT personnel were involved to varying degrees) and a LIVEX involving 5 surface combatants (4 as exercise participants and 1 as the observer platform), 3 Military Patrol Aircraft (MPA), 2 helicopters, 2 fighter aircraft, Turkish Coast Guard and Custom Boats and numerous Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) assets from Turkey and three other participating nations. Anatolian Sun clearly demonstrated Turkey's commitment to countering the proliferation of WMD and related materials.
21. There were two areas of note associated with Anatolian Sun:
(a) The CPX was conducted primarily as a Turkish national exercise with limited opportunities incorporated into the scenario for other nations to participate. While the CPX did not focus on developing international communications; given the traditionally weak interagency links within the GOT, this arrangement greatly enhanced Turkey's capacity and ability to respond in the future to an actual PSI action.
(b) The in port inspection/decontamination phase may have been too complicated for some observers. Turkey clearly demonstrated their willingness and capability to conduct these types of operations. However, observers from non-PSI nations may have been left with the impression that their respective country would be required to have these same capabilities in order to endorse PSI.
In spite of these minor issues Turkey did an outstanding job planning and executing a complex PSI exercise. The exercise was very well organized, well attended, met many of the training objectives of the PSI, and provided an outstanding opportunity for outreach activities.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
