Wikileaks - CCCLVI
68300 6/16/2006 10:58 06SOFIA848 Embassy Sofia CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN 06BUCHAREST981|06SOFIA601|06SOFIA743|06STATE79658 VZCZCXYZ0016 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHSF #0848/01 1671058 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 161058Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2083 INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0668 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 1323 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0014 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0104 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0222 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 0505 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0555 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0215 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0030 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000848
SIPDIS
NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2016 TAGS: PREL, NATO, MARR, MOPS, RO, TU, BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA CAUTIOUS ON BLACK SEA HARMONY
REF: A. STATE 79658 B. SOFIA 743 C. BUCHAREST 981 D. SOFIA 601
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 14.
2. (C) SUMMARY. The GOB's impression of the June 5 Black Sea Forum in Bucharest was generally positive. While at the forum, the Bulgarian delegation received a draft bilateral agreement from Turkey to join Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH). The GOB has not responded to the Turkish offer. However, Bulgaria's current policy supports extending Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) into the Black Sea. Realizing that this is unlikely to happen, the Bulgarians may consider cooperating with OBSH without formally joining. Defense Minister Bliznakov voiced the usual Bulgarian concerns to the Ambassador June 14, including sensitivities regarding Bulgarian operations under a Turkish flag. The GOB has requested details on how an expanded OBSH would facilitate increased U.S. or NATO involvement in Black Sea security issues (Ref A). A trilateral expert-level meeting between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey is scheduled for June 19 in Bucharest to discuss OBSH. END SUMMARY.
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Generally Positive on the Black Sea Forum...
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3. (C) In a conversation with Poloff June 14, Plamen Bonchev, Director of the MFA's NATO and International Security Directorate, described the June 5 Black Sea Forum as useful. Bulgaria supports future forums "as long as they don't go too far in creating new permanent institutions." Bonchev welcomed the USG's announcement that it would contribute to the Black Sea Trust (Ref B) as a very positive result. However, he characterized the forum's discussion of frozen regional conflicts as "not very productive."
4. (U) Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin used the June 5 forum to stress Bulgaria's role in the Black Sea region as a NATO member and a future EU member. In a June 5 MFA press release, Kalfin said, "NATO and the EU are natural partners in the region." In a reference to the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit Communique, Kalfin said, "In practice, the Black Sea is already a part of the area of responsibility of the Alliance. We welcome the increased interest of the EU, and we are ready to assist the further formulation of an overall approach towards the region."
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...But Cool to OBSH
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5. (C) Poloff met with Yordan Bozhilov, head of the MOD's International Cooperation Directorate, June 13 to discuss his attendance at the June 5 forum and follow up on our May 23 demarche (Ref B). Bozhilov stressed Bulgaria's desire for NATO involvement in the Black Sea. He said the Bulgarian delegation had hoped to use the forum as an opportunity to learn more about U.S. plans for a U.S./NATO role in Black Sea security (Ref B).
6. (C) Bozhilov said that at the forum, the Turkish Navy N5, Rear Admiral Cem Gurdeniz, handed the Bulgarian Navy Chief, Rear Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev, a draft bilateral memorandum that, if signed by both countries, would make Bulgaria a member of OBSH. Bozhilov characterized the memorandum as a bilateral international agreement, and said it was "unacceptable to the GOB for military-technical and political reasons." One of the MOD's main reservations to OBSH participation is that the Turkish memorandum would place Bulgarian naval vessels under a Turkish national command structure. The perception of subordination is a problem, even if Turkey cannot in fact issues orders to Bulgarian vessels. Referring to the draft memorandum, Bozhilov insisted that the exchange of maritime surveillance information with Turkey "should not lead to the obligation for a Bulgarian naval vessel to take concrete action against a (suspicious) ship."
7. (C) Naval Attache spoke with Deputy CHOD Vice Admiral Lyutskanov June 13, who said that the General Staff would recommend against joining OBSH. He summarized the military's objections:
- The Black Sea is not a closed sea. It does not belong to the Black Sea countries.
- Information should be shared with CC-MAR Naples, not through Turkey.
- A NATO operation is the best way for Bulgaria to have an equal seat at the table.
- A solution on Black Sea security should "make everyone equally unhappy without giving dominance to one country."
Lyutskanov stressed that the recommendation against OBSH "is a military recommendation, and the politicians must still decide."
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Bulgaria's Policy: OAE in the Black Sea
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8. (C) The MFA's Bonchev told Poloff June 14 that the GOB is in a "very delicate stage" regarding the U.S. request to consider OBSH participation (Ref A), and that Bulgaria has had strong reservations from the beginning about OBSH. Bonchev stated that Bulgaria continues to support the extension of Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) into the Black Sea.
9. (C/NF) Bonchev noted that before 2004, Turkey was the only NATO member on the Black Sea. He said that certain NATO military planning documents reflected this fact by designating Turkey as the lead alliance member for NATO activities in the Black Sea. Bonchev said that now "the situation is completely changed, but Turkey is insisting on keeping its special status based on the argument that Bulgaria and Romania do not have the same military capabilities." He acknowledged Turkish contributions to Black Sea security, but stressed that "regional security should be a part of Euro-Atlantic security."
10. (C) While assuring us that Bulgaria does not want to prevent any positive developments that affect Black Sea security, Bonchev stated, "We will never agree (to OBSH participation) if this is going to replace NATO in the Black Sea." He emphasized Bulgaria's long-standing view of Black Sea issues in a wider NATO/EU context. Bonchev mentioned informally that, in light of the recently ratified Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. (Ref D), an expanded U.S./NATO role would provide the U.S. with more opportunities to continue to expand its profile in the region.
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Trilateral Talks Scheduled for June 19
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11. (C) MOD and MFA sources informed us that Bulgaria has received an invitation to participate in expert-level trilateral talks with Romania and Turkey in Bucharest on June 19. The agenda will include SFOR, NATO's political committee discussions on the Black Sea, and, most importantly, OBSH. The MFA's Bonchev said that Bulgaria will almost certainly attend. He said that Romania has already entered into discussions with Turkey on OBSH, and he speculated that Romania may cooperate with OBSH without actually joining. Bonchev said that this could also be an option for Bulgaria.
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Defense Minister Raises OBSH Concerns with Ambassador
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12. (C) Defense Minister Veselin Bliznakov raised OBSH with Ambassador June 15, voicing the usual Bulgarian concerns, including the domestic political and public relations considerations regarding Bulgarian operations under a Turkish flag. Explaining the we are currently determining what our connection to OBSH would be, Ambassador told him that the U.S. understood it was difficult for Bulgaria to say yes to OBSH right now, but it should not say no at this point, either. Bliznakov thanked Ambassador for the suggestion, which he clearly found appealing, and said he would pass the idea to Foreign Minister Kalfin.
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Comment
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13. (C) The Bulgarians remain deeply skeptical of an expanded OBSH. They regard the Black Sea as an area in which NATO has already declared its intention to become involved, and they view OBSH as a Turkish national operation. The GOB fears that agreeing to join, or even cooperate with, OBSH would close the door on the possibility of OAE or a similar NATO operation in the Black Sea. At the popular level, Turkey can also be a hot-button political issue, given Bulgaria's history of Ottoman rule. The Bulgarians seek to better understand the USG's vision for U.S. and NATO involvement in regional security issues to which we have alluded (Ref A). We believe the best way forward is to articulate in greater detail the thought process that led to our recent request to consider OBSH. Following the signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (Ref D), which signifies a deeper strategic security relationship with the U.S., the Bulgarians are eager to engage with us on this issue.
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Action Request
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14. (C/NF) We request supplemental talking points to Ref A to address:
- How Bulgarian membership in OBSH would facilitate future U.S or NATO involvement in Black Sea security issues.
- Whether something short of Bulgarian membership in OBSH, perhaps information sharing, would meet U.S. objectives.
- Whether an expanded OBSH would be a permanent solution or would be superseded by a future mechanism, possibly under NATO. Beyrle
