A WoT is weak subjectivity.

I really don't give a shit what three nobody neckbeards wetfarted on each other. Stop spamming inane links to shit, I won't have to shitcan you.

You seem to misconstrue my point? My prior comments were somewhat incoherent. The essence of the problem with proof-of-stake is that there’s nothing-at-stake (no cost to attack it and thus no objective reality) — it’s essentially the delusion of democrazy. That was the point of linking you to my comments at the bottom of the Eth wiki wherein I reiterated the problems with proof-of-stake.

The problem with Nakamoto proof-of-work is that it’s also democrazy because it subjects the major minority to the will of the simple majority aka the 50+% attack. The attack will be profitable via the extortion of censoring transactions. It appears to have been designed for this outcome because eventually the mining reward-based Nash equilibrium is lost as the protocol reward shrinks relative to the transaction fees reward aka incentives compatibility for consensus is lost and an oligarchy must take control to enforce consensus. Bitcoin eventually becomes a permissioned, fiat system and there will be only one sovereign who controls it. It’s Biblical.

The design I vaguely contemplated and posited may be the only alternative. I essentially posit to combine proof-of-work to eliminate nothing-at-stake with the objectivity of being there in real-time (a facet of proof-of-stake without the nothing-at-stake) to eliminate the weakness of Bitcoin — i.e. 50+% attacks are eliminated. The tradeoff is that my design has no prima facie objectivity for those who weren’t there in real-time, so they’ll need to trust someone that was and thus the analogy to a WoT and my reference to Vitalik's weak subjectivity but that shouldn’t be conflated with nothing-at-stake. Yet there’s still prima facie objectivity as the amount of proof-of-work that has been burned and thus the value of that blockchain — thus ultimately the non-fraudulent chain should eventually become the longest difficulty chain possessing the prima facie objectivity of Bitcoin after all, without Bitcoin’s major flaw. And after further thought I do believe the design I’m contemplating converges on consensus. The key distinction is that the reward for consensus the cost of loss of value of all one’s investment in the tokens instead of the mining reward. All those who are sufficiently vested will not form a consensus around the longest difficulty chain which is a fraud (as they observed it in real-time) because if fraud can succeed then their investment is ultimately worthless. Thus my design allows for fraud chains to fork off in their 50+% uneconomic, democrazy delusion whilst the vested economic majority are unaffected.

Perhaps this is my comeback ticket.