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	<title>Comments on: And now I shall be off scarfing smoked salmon and fresh apple pie seasoned with free market tears, or Why a collection of confused retards does not amount to a free market.</title>
	<atom:link href="http://trilema.com/2013/and-now-i-shall-be-off-scarfing-smoked-salmon-and-fresh-apple-pie-seasoned-with-free-market-tears-or-why-a-collection-of-confused-retards-does-not-amount-to-a-free-market/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://trilema.com/2013/and-now-i-shall-be-off-scarfing-smoked-salmon-and-fresh-apple-pie-seasoned-with-free-market-tears-or-why-a-collection-of-confused-retards-does-not-amount-to-a-free-market/</link>
	<description>Moving targets for a fast crowd.</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 15:56:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Degeneration, by Max Nordau. Adnotated. The Symptoms. on Trilema - A blog by Mircea Popescu.</title>
		<link>http://trilema.com/2013/and-now-i-shall-be-off-scarfing-smoked-salmon-and-fresh-apple-pie-seasoned-with-free-market-tears-or-why-a-collection-of-confused-retards-does-not-amount-to-a-free-market/#comment-162911</link>
		<dc:creator>Degeneration, by Max Nordau. Adnotated. The Symptoms. on Trilema - A blog by Mircea Popescu.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2021 07:14:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://trilema.com/?p=49891#comment-162911</guid>
		<description>[...] curse of modernism, as an intellectual attempt, is precisely this "fake it, maybe you make it" thing. If the little Corsican who wasn't an Emperor could pretend like he were an emperor [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] curse of modernism, as an intellectual attempt, is precisely this "fake it, maybe you make it" thing. If the little Corsican who wasn't an Emperor could pretend like he were an emperor [...]</p>
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		<title>By: It's still not me</title>
		<link>http://trilema.com/2013/and-now-i-shall-be-off-scarfing-smoked-salmon-and-fresh-apple-pie-seasoned-with-free-market-tears-or-why-a-collection-of-confused-retards-does-not-amount-to-a-free-market/#comment-121992</link>
		<dc:creator>It's still not me</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 May 2017 18:51:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://trilema.com/?p=49891#comment-121992</guid>
		<description>Why am I back to year 5, do you really serve up old stale bread on your home page address? Otay though, all information is asymettrix. When all information is distributed evenly, there is no more downhill, and we have perfect smoothness. I for one, still do not believe in entropy, though I do love my Sister-in-law, Shannon R., but that is the other kind. Okay, how much does it cost to buy an FuckGoats? I really can't go out of my way to buy an FPGA, I really don't even like Xilinx, but JTAG rox. So, I didn't see the price on yer site, just the cost.

I also ran into the hitlery porn shit, that is rude man. No wonder people say what they do. I still like you though, even though our bacon number is 2. You know Tim May, Anton, Lizard, Jamey Donnald? WoT!!!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why am I back to year 5, do you really serve up old stale bread on your home page address? Otay though, all information is asymettrix. When all information is distributed evenly, there is no more downhill, and we have perfect smoothness. I for one, still do not believe in entropy, though I do love my Sister-in-law, Shannon R., but that is the other kind. Okay, how much does it cost to buy an FuckGoats? I really can't go out of my way to buy an FPGA, I really don't even like Xilinx, but JTAG rox. So, I didn't see the price on yer site, just the cost.</p>
<p>I also ran into the hitlery porn shit, that is rude man. No wonder people say what they do. I still like you though, even though our bacon number is 2. You know Tim May, Anton, Lizard, Jamey Donnald? WoT!!!</p>
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		<title>By: Mircea Popescu</title>
		<link>http://trilema.com/2013/and-now-i-shall-be-off-scarfing-smoked-salmon-and-fresh-apple-pie-seasoned-with-free-market-tears-or-why-a-collection-of-confused-retards-does-not-amount-to-a-free-market/#comment-95505</link>
		<dc:creator>Mircea Popescu</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2013 21:28:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://trilema.com/?p=49891#comment-95505</guid>
		<description>I can easily grant that one can't simply barge in and declare any random market dysfunctional on the grounds that he's identified some real (or oft imagined) asymmetry. 

The problem with the "economic agents know they don't know" statement is that it requires possibly one of the most difficult mental skills for the human race. For some reason this is just... hard!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I can easily grant that one can't simply barge in and declare any random market dysfunctional on the grounds that he's identified some real (or oft imagined) asymmetry. </p>
<p>The problem with the "economic agents know they don't know" statement is that it requires possibly one of the most difficult mental skills for the human race. For some reason this is just... hard!</p>
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		<title>By: Mateusz Wywial</title>
		<link>http://trilema.com/2013/and-now-i-shall-be-off-scarfing-smoked-salmon-and-fresh-apple-pie-seasoned-with-free-market-tears-or-why-a-collection-of-confused-retards-does-not-amount-to-a-free-market/#comment-95504</link>
		<dc:creator>Mateusz Wywial</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2013 21:21:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://trilema.com/?p=49891#comment-95504</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;
We are not discussing the same thing here. In my model the car has an objective value attached to it, which would be its “true value”. In your model the car has no objective value attached to it, and instead it is represented by context-values. Thus it ends up having one value in the buyer’s context (presumably some sort of utility-value) and another in the seller’s (presumably some sort of “what can it be sold for” value). Thus in my perspective the market operates to discover the “true value” of the car, within arbitrary precision, whereas in your perspective the market operates to negotiate translation between contexts.
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

While I agree that when discussing a more complex problem, this difference would be very important, in this case objective-value approach can be translated to one presented by me quite easily. The value for buyers should be exactly the same as value for sellers. Then, obviously, the market will be broken. Still, I believe that my question remains valid: not every market is the one for goods with objective value (marginal value for marginal buyers seems much more frequent in reality) and thus to determine if asymmetric information is harmful one must inspect that particular market and not invoke the theory.

As to the alleged &lt;i&gt;petitio principii&lt;/i&gt;, it might be a result of inadequate clarification from my part. My reasoning was as follows:
The theory points that upon asymmetric information, it will be either relatively irrelevant (as in my case A) or destructive (case B). If market exists, then it is probably case A. Unless participants are deluded and do not know that they do not possess perfect knowledge, or equilibrium is not yet reached in case B. 
I of course agree that market participants' delusion wreaks havoc on both the market and participants themselves, I noted it explicitly:
&lt;blockquote&gt;
For an exchange to be mutually beneficial, it is only necessary that the economic actors know that they do not have perfect information, which is much weaker assumption than symmetric information.
&lt;/blockquote&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>
We are not discussing the same thing here. In my model the car has an objective value attached to it, which would be its “true value”. In your model the car has no objective value attached to it, and instead it is represented by context-values. Thus it ends up having one value in the buyer’s context (presumably some sort of utility-value) and another in the seller’s (presumably some sort of “what can it be sold for” value). Thus in my perspective the market operates to discover the “true value” of the car, within arbitrary precision, whereas in your perspective the market operates to negotiate translation between contexts.
</p></blockquote>
<p>While I agree that when discussing a more complex problem, this difference would be very important, in this case objective-value approach can be translated to one presented by me quite easily. The value for buyers should be exactly the same as value for sellers. Then, obviously, the market will be broken. Still, I believe that my question remains valid: not every market is the one for goods with objective value (marginal value for marginal buyers seems much more frequent in reality) and thus to determine if asymmetric information is harmful one must inspect that particular market and not invoke the theory.</p>
<p>As to the alleged <i>petitio principii</i>, it might be a result of inadequate clarification from my part. My reasoning was as follows:<br />
The theory points that upon asymmetric information, it will be either relatively irrelevant (as in my case A) or destructive (case B). If market exists, then it is probably case A. Unless participants are deluded and do not know that they do not possess perfect knowledge, or equilibrium is not yet reached in case B.<br />
I of course agree that market participants' delusion wreaks havoc on both the market and participants themselves, I noted it explicitly:</p>
<blockquote><p>
For an exchange to be mutually beneficial, it is only necessary that the economic actors know that they do not have perfect information, which is much weaker assumption than symmetric information.
</p></blockquote>
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		<title>By: Mircea Popescu</title>
		<link>http://trilema.com/2013/and-now-i-shall-be-off-scarfing-smoked-salmon-and-fresh-apple-pie-seasoned-with-free-market-tears-or-why-a-collection-of-confused-retards-does-not-amount-to-a-free-market/#comment-95503</link>
		<dc:creator>Mircea Popescu</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2013 21:14:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://trilema.com/?p=49891#comment-95503</guid>
		<description>Yes, yes. It's something like this : suppose a tribe of Indians meets a bunch of Dutchmen. Suppose these unrelated tribes that never met before use a common currency, for the same value and in the same way (this is patently nonsensical, even if the currency is a bullion metal, but hey, we're in the area of academic economics, so this is par for  the course). Suppose they are trading an item, be that item "cars".

For the Indians, the utility-value of cars is normally distributed in the [1, 100] interval. For the Dutch, the utility-value of cars is normally distributed in the [200, 400] interval. (This was actually the case historically, with various spices, tobacco and whatnot. &lt;em&gt;Pomodori&lt;/em&gt; are ethimologically reflective of the situation.)

In this highly contrived nonsensical context, should the buyers cartel (as they normally would in similar, real circumstances) and offer 50 per car, they will acquire all the cars in the [1, 49] interval, or roughly half the cars. This again is patent nonsense, as the Indian who sees his friend sell his 13 worth car for a 300% profit is not likely to sell his 49 car for a 2% profit, and this is also how the Dutch find out about how to value cars in the Indian system, but hey.

The average &lt;em&gt;profit&lt;/em&gt; of the Indian in this theoretical example would be 25 per sold car. The average profit of the Dutchman would be 250 per bought car. Together they realise a profit of 275, which is unevenly split. 

Admitting no further cars are produced as a result of this, and the demand on the Dutch side is not satisfyied, the next round will result in as many cars being sold, for a price of 100 each, yielding the Indians the same 25 per sold car in profit, but the Dutch merely 200, for a total of 225, which is somewhat more evenly split this time. 

At this point it's game over and the Dutch have all the fishies (which is not exactly unlike the result of "free market" interactions between the actual Indians and the actual Europeans in the continental US, as we can find today in the field). The Dutch continue to happily trade their cars among themselves for something in the [200, 400] range and that's that. The price has increased towards average values and the profit distribution has pushed towards balance, slightly, somewhat, for as long as the Indians still had any cars at least. After which it was a 100% Dutch affair and good luck Daisy.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, yes. It's something like this : suppose a tribe of Indians meets a bunch of Dutchmen. Suppose these unrelated tribes that never met before use a common currency, for the same value and in the same way (this is patently nonsensical, even if the currency is a bullion metal, but hey, we're in the area of academic economics, so this is par for  the course). Suppose they are trading an item, be that item "cars".</p>
<p>For the Indians, the utility-value of cars is normally distributed in the [1, 100] interval. For the Dutch, the utility-value of cars is normally distributed in the [200, 400] interval. (This was actually the case historically, with various spices, tobacco and whatnot. <em>Pomodori</em> are ethimologically reflective of the situation.)</p>
<p>In this highly contrived nonsensical context, should the buyers cartel (as they normally would in similar, real circumstances) and offer 50 per car, they will acquire all the cars in the [1, 49] interval, or roughly half the cars. This again is patent nonsense, as the Indian who sees his friend sell his 13 worth car for a 300% profit is not likely to sell his 49 car for a 2% profit, and this is also how the Dutch find out about how to value cars in the Indian system, but hey.</p>
<p>The average <em>profit</em> of the Indian in this theoretical example would be 25 per sold car. The average profit of the Dutchman would be 250 per bought car. Together they realise a profit of 275, which is unevenly split. </p>
<p>Admitting no further cars are produced as a result of this, and the demand on the Dutch side is not satisfyied, the next round will result in as many cars being sold, for a price of 100 each, yielding the Indians the same 25 per sold car in profit, but the Dutch merely 200, for a total of 225, which is somewhat more evenly split this time. </p>
<p>At this point it's game over and the Dutch have all the fishies (which is not exactly unlike the result of "free market" interactions between the actual Indians and the actual Europeans in the continental US, as we can find today in the field). The Dutch continue to happily trade their cars among themselves for something in the [200, 400] range and that's that. The price has increased towards average values and the profit distribution has pushed towards balance, slightly, somewhat, for as long as the Indians still had any cars at least. After which it was a 100% Dutch affair and good luck Daisy.</p>
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