136637 1/8/2008 20:42 08STATE2034 Secretary of State CONFIDENTIAL 07STATE156270 R 082042Z JAN 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY ASTANA AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BELGRADE AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY JAKARTA AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MINSK AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY PANAMA AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY SANAA AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE AMEMBASSY SOFIA AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY VALLETTA AMEMBASSY VILNIUS AMCONSUL HONG KONG AIT TAIPEI 0000 C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 002034
PARIS FOR EST:H. SMITH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2033 TAGS: MTCRE, PARM, MNUC, ETTC, KSCA, TSPA, FR, GR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 5-9, 2007 ATHENS PLENARY (C)
REF: 07 STATE 156270
Classified By: ISN DAS Donald A. Mahley. Reason: 1.4 (B), (D). H).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the November 5-9, 2007 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary meeting in Athens, the 34 MTCR Partners reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening missile-related export controls and thereby discouraging missile activities and programs of concern. They discussed trends in missile development worldwide, including the rapid changes in technology which require the MTCR to continuously adapt to keep pace with the evolving missile threat, and reiterated their concerns about the serious threat posed by the growing risk of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The MTCR Partners noted that regional missile proliferation continues to be a serious problem and expressed particular concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. They also expressed their determination to exercise vigilance and prevent transfers of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD ballistic missile programs of proliferation concern and called on all States to fully and effectively implement the relevant provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718, 1737, and 1747.
2. (C) The Partners also held in-depth discussions ) in both the Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) and the Plenary ) on a U.S. proposal to modify how the Regime controls Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles. The majority of the Partners supported the proposal, but the Partners were not able to agree to adopt it. Russia led the opposition, proposing as an alternative a comprehensive, zero-based review of the Regime,s control criteria, goals, and purpose so that Russia and other Partners that were not present when the MTCR was established in 1987 could have a hand in shaping the basic parameters of the Regime. Brazil and South Africa both continued to reserve on the proposal.
3. (C) During the TEM, the Partners adopted a number of changes to the MTCR Annex (control list) to keep pace with technological advances and trends in proliferation procurement. At the Law Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM), Partners exchanged information on best practices and recent efforts in interdiction. They also agreed to continue their efforts to update the law enforcement experts handbook. The Partners also shared information on priority developments in missile proliferation and engaged in an extremely substantive and productive Information Exchange (IE) session.
4. (C) No new members were admitted to the Regime at Athens. However, the Partners agreed on a broad spectrum of contacts with non-members concerning the missile proliferation threat and the MTCR's goals and activities.
5. (C) KEY PLENARY OUTCOMES:
--Partners agreed to exercise vigilance against the export to Iran of listed items, materials, goods and technology, consistent with UNSCRs 1696 and 1737. They also took note of U.S. information on Iranian front companies relevant to these efforts.
--Partners reiterated their support for UNSCR 1540 and agreed the MTCR Chair should continue to pursue contact with the 1540 Committee.
--Partners adopted a U.S. proposal on outreach to non-members. Specifically, Partners were encouraged to use their national outreach efforts to actively encourage non-Partners to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis.
--Partners also agreed that the MTCR Chair, with assistance from the TEM Chair, should inform non-Partner countries of changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, with a view to facilitating the widest possible application of these documents and enabling interested non-Partners to harmonize their controls with MTCR standards.
--Partners agreed to a 45-day silence procedure regarding a German proposal on suggested best practices for sharing and using Regime denial information.
--Partners agreed to a number of changes to the MTCR Annex, including an amendment of the payload definition for &other UAVs;8 creation of a new control for an oxidizer substance usable in solid propellant rocket motors (Item 4.C.4.b.5); adoption of strengthened controls for environmental chambers; and clarification of the control text for two polymeric substances and a technical note for maraging steels.
--Partners agreed on the utility of holding a joint session of the IE, LEEM, and TEM at future Plenary meetings.
--Partners reaffirmed their agreement to update the MTCR Enforcement Officers Handbook. This project will be coordinated by Canada.
--Partners agreed to hold a Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting in Paris no later than April 2008.
--Partners accepted Australia,s offer to host/chair the Plenary in 2008 Plenary, and to serve as MTCR Chair in 2008-2009.
////////////////// Opening Statements //////////////////
6. (C) Following the formal opening of the Plenary on November 5 by outgoing Danish Chairman Ambassador Per Fischer, the MTCR Partners confirmed Ambassador Eleftherios Danellis as the 2007 MTCR Chair. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary General for European Affairs Dimitrios Katsoudas then delivered opening remarks. Portugal (on behalf of the EU states participating in the MTCR and Norway), the Russian Federation, Australia, Japan, and Turkey also made opening statements.
7. (C) During his remarks, Secretary General Katsoudas stressed the importance of further strengthening the MTCR as a means for helping to maintain regional security and stability, and the need for the MTCR Partners to underscore their commitment to implementing fully and effectively all missile nonproliferation-relevant UNSCRs. He also noted the importance of focusing on the proliferant activities of non-state actors as well as countries with programs of concern.
8. (C) The EU statement lauded the Regime for its contributions over the past twenty years in slowing or halting missile development programs around the world and its work in establishing a standard for responsible missile nonproliferation behavior. The EU also stressed the commitment of all EU countries to missile nonproliferation and urged Partners to search for new ways to further strengthen the MTCR,s effectiveness. In particular, the EU urged that additional emphasis be placed on outreach to non-members and to admitting countries with long-pending applications to membership in the Regime, e.g., Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Finally, the EU urged enhanced support by the MTCR to the UNSCR 1540 Committee and recommended adoption of an EU proposal to give special attention to a &Watch List8 of items of particular utility to the Iranian missile program.
9. (C) Russia said that missile nonproliferation and strengthening the MTCR are among its top foreign policy priorities and cited Russia,s initiative to universalize the INF Treaty as an example of its commitment to missile nonproliferation. Russia also wished to increase the Regime,s effectiveness to adapt to &new realities and technology challenges,8 and suggested that it might be time for the Regime to re-evaluate the basic parameters of the Regime, to assess the global missile threat, and then to collectively identify how to shape the Regime to address the threat, including by adjusting the control parameters.
10. (C) Russia also noted that in its view the Regime would only be &functional8 when it admits those countries that are actively developing missile and space programs. Russia therefore hoped the Regime would increase its outreach efforts with that goal in mind. Additionally, Russia urged that Partners not try to single out any one country as a bad proliferator but to take a regional approach to nonproliferation. Additionally, Russia reminded Partners that the MTCR is not a sanctions Regime and said Russia would not favor actions that attempt to duplicate or extend the work of the UN Security Council. Finally, Russia called on the MTCR to continue its cooperation with the 1540 Committee.
11. (C) Japan stressed the threat to international peace and security posed by Iran,s and North Korea,s missile programs. It also underscored the need for the MTCR Partners to act in concert and implement the measures outlined in relevant UNSCRs as a way to prevent the transfer to/from Iran and North Korea of WMD-related goods and technology.
12. (C) Turkey agreed and said it had taken note of what had been said about Iran and North Korea in the IE and LEEM. Turkey also thought the MTCR needed to have &practical applications8 if it were to be useful. Additionally, Turkey noted that it hoped issues with Iran would be resolved by diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiations for peace in the region and the Middle East.
13. (SBU) Australia looked forward to a productive Plenary and hoped the Partners would give favorable consideration to Australia,s proposal to host the Plenary in 2008 and serve as MTCR Chair.
////////////////////////////////////// Report on the Danish MTCR Chairmanship //////////////////////////////////////
14. (C) Outgoing MTCR Chair Per Fischer read verbatim a 16-page, written report on his tenure (the report also was circulated to all Partners). Fischer noted that the Chair had engaged in a number of outreach activities to promote the MTCR and to remind non-Partners of the need for all countries to implement and enforce effective missile export controls. The Chair's outreach activities had included leading MTCR missions to several non-Partner countries, as well as participation in seminars, regional fora, and other multilateral meetings. All of these activities helped to enhance understanding of the goals and activities of the Regime. They also have helped to maintain and improve relations with countries like India, Israel, Pakistan, and China.
15. (C) Fischer noted that outreach was becoming increasingly important as more countries outside of the Regime become developers, producers, or traders of missile technology, and urged Partners to follow his lead and make the technical aspects of the Regime an integral part of any outreach activities. Explaining to non-Partners what the MTCR controls and why ) and discussing how the Partners implement MTCR controls on a day-to-day basis ) has been critical to the success of the Chair,s outreach activities in 2007. It also has helped build a better understanding of the Regime,s goals. Finally, Fischer strongly urged Partners to consider systematically informing the 1540 Committee and other interested parties of changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex directly after they have been decided at a Plenary.
16. (C) The Plenary thanked Ambassador Fischer for his extremely detailed report and excellent work during the past year on behalf of the Regime. However, while acknowledging Chairman Fischer outstanding efforts, Russia raised concerns about Fischer,s participation in a NATO-sponsored event in Lithuania. Fischer responded that he had announced his intention to represent the MTCR at the seminar via his report to all Partners on planned outreach events. No Partner raised objections. Consequently, per established practice, Fischer had agreement to pursue the activities described in his outreach plan. Russia thanked Fischer for the explanation and undertook to pay closer attention in the future to documents circulated by the Chair. South Africa added that it would do likewise.
////////////////////////////// Report of the French MTCR POC /////////////////////////////
17. (C) France briefly summarized the activities of the MTCR Point of Contact (POC) during the preceding year. It reported that the POC had circulated 274 documents to Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary. The POC also had updated the Compendium of Consensus Decisions, and hoped to distribute it soon. In addition, the POC had continued to develop the "ePOC" computerized document distribution system for the MTCR; organized five meetings of the MTCR country representatives in Paris; and hosted the RPOC meeting in April 2007.
18. (C) The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report. They also thanked the POC ) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs ) for its invaluable services on behalf of the Regime.
/////////////////////////////////// Report of the April 2007 Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting ///////////////////////////////////
19. (C) The POC reported on the results of the April 2007 RPOC meeting in Paris, noting that outreach to non-Partners and relevant organizations had been a major focus of discussion. In addition, RPOC participants had exchanged views on the current state of ballistic missile-related proliferation worldwide, with most contributors centering on Iran, and agreed to discuss these issues further at the 2007 Plenary. The RPOC also considered a German proposal on end-use controls and denial notifications, and agreed to continue discussing membership issues at the 2007 Plenary. Finally, the Partners confirmed Greece as the 2007 Plenary chair/host and subsequent MTCR Chair.
20. (C) The Partners thanked France for hosting the 2007 RPOC and endorsed the RPOC report (POC 133). They also accepted France's proposal to host the next RPOC in Paris before the end of April 2008.
//////////// EPOC Update ///////////
21. (C) The POC reported on the continued development of the &ePOC8 computerized information distribution system for the MTCR. 29 of 34 MTCR countries currently can access ePOC, and there are 246 registered users. This is nearly double the number of registered users reported at the 2006 Copenhagen Plenary. The POC invited all Partners to begin using ePOC regularly as this would increase efficiency. Ideally, the POC would like to see generalized use of the ePOC by the time of the 2008 RPOC meeting and hoped that the Regime will soon go paperless.
22. (C) Germany thanked the POC for its continuing efforts to improve the ePOC. The UK also applauded the POC,s Herculean efforts on behalf of the Regime and noted that HMG has 18 registered ePOC users. The U.S. welcomed and appreciated the POC,s efforts to develop ePOC, and liked the idea of a paperless Regime. However, the U.S. noted that ePOC can only handle documents up to the confidential level. Higher level documents must be circulated in paper copy. While the U.S. will continue to try to develop papers at the confidential level, the nature of the MTCR is that some
SIPDIS issues are more sensitive and need to be distributed in paper copy. The U.S. hoped that the POC would continue to circulate paper copies of such documents. The POC responded that this practice would continue to be followed.
23. (C) The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report on ePOC, inviting Partners that have not yet signed up for ePOC to do so soon. The Partners also renewed the POC,s mandate to continue ePOC operations and agreed by consensus on the following:
&The Plenary entrusted the POC with the mandate to continue ePOC operations. The Plenary expressed its satisfaction at the current level of security of the ePOC, which was deemed to strike a satisfactory balance between security and user-friendliness.8
///////////////////////// Contact with Non-Partners /////////////////////////
24. (C) Germany, Portugal (on behalf of the EU), the ROK, and the U.S. reported on their bilateral and regional contacts with non-Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary. Several countries, including the United States (POC 198), also circulated written reports on their contacts with non-Partners. However, Russia commented that too much time was being devoted to outreach ) a topic that Russia considered to be a &secondary issue8 ) and said that it would pay closer attention to the Plenary agenda in the future to ensure that outreach was given sufficient but not undue attention. The Greek Chair responded that the Plenary would ignore Russia,s comment: outreach is a key focus of the Regime and is properly placed on the Plenary agenda.
///////////////////////// Regional Nonproliferation /////////////////////////
25. (C) Portugal, on behalf of the EU participating states, presented the EU states, revised proposal for an MTCR watch list on Iran. NOTE: This proposal was previously circulated as POC DOC 61. It was discussed at the April 2007 RPOC, but failed to achieve consensus. It was subsequently subjected to a silence procedure, which failed when Russia broke silence (POC 112). END NOTE. Portugal explained that the proposed watch list contained items that EU experts believe deserve special attention either because they have been observed to be items Iranian end-users of concern are attempting to acquire or because they are assessed to be chokepoints for the Iranian missile program. The proposal was not intended to expand UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 or the MTCR Annex and would not impose punitive measures on Iran. Rather, the EU states view the watch list as a tool that could help MTCR Partner countries implement relevant UNSCRs.
26. (C) The U.S. greatly appreciated the EU proposal as an effort to focus Partner attention on key technologies Iranian end-users of concern are seeking. The U.S. also reminded Partners that the U.S. had circulated a complementary proposal on Iranian Front Companies as POC 190, and urged Partners to consider the two proposals in tandem.
27. (C) Turkey supported the EU proposal. Portugal expressed support for the U.S. proposal. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, and Spain all endorsed both proposals. Ukraine said it supported the EU proposal in principal but wanted more time to review the watch list. Ukraine also thought the Partners should consider whether to amend the MTCR Annex to control the items included on the proposed watch list.
28. (C) South Africa appreciated the Partners, interest in discussing how to respond to missile proliferation and regional developments. However, in South Africa,s view, the Regime needed to take a comprehensive approach and focus on broad regional issues, not just one country. Thus far the Regime has been focusing on two proposals that relate to UN Security Council action on Iran as it pertains to WMD delivery systems. However, the Security Council also has taken action on North Korea, so the MTCR should not focus only on Iran. Additionally, South Africa said the MTCR must remember that it is not the UNSC. The Security Council has committees that implement its resolutions, and any decision to expand the lists associated with the UNSCRs should be done by these committees. The MTCR is on dangerous ground when it tries to reinterpret or add to what the Security Council has done.
29. (C) With regard to the EU and U.S. proposals, South Africa noted that they relate to information derived from the Information Exchange (IE) and suggested the Partners simply take note of the relevant IE information. In the end, South Africa said, all MTCR Partners have national obligations to implement the relevant UNSCRs. Therefore, South Africa is not convinced the MTCR needs to adopt additional lists to build on or expand the relevant UNSCRS.
30. (C) Noting that Russia is a member of the Security Council, Russia agreed that the MTCR should not try to expand the Security Council,s work. Russia further noted that the UNSCRs already are obligatory and legally binding on all UN members, and that is sufficient. Russia also stressed that the MTCR is not an implementation body of the UN and should not be used as such, nor should it be used as a sanctions body. In Russia,s view, the MTCR is an export control regime and nothing more.
31. (C) Continuing, Russia said its review of the EU proposal had uncovered no &value added.8 Instead, Russia had concluded that the proposal raised a number of questions. In particular, Russia questioned whether the proposed watch list represented all items of concern with regard to the Iranian missile program. Russia also wondered why the EU did not submit proposals to the TEM to add these items to the MTCR Annex. In addition, Russia was concerned that having such a watch list would undermine the Regime,s catch-all controls. However, in the spirit of constructiveness and consistency, Russia offered that it would be willing to combine the U.S. and EU proposals and simply take note of the lists of Iranian Front Companies and dual-use technologies. In Russia,s view, these lists then could be used to inform Partners, national export licensing processes.
32. (C) The UK supported the U.S. and EU proposals. It noted that while the MTCR is not a UN enforcement agency, it also does not operate in a vacuum. Partners come to the Plenary to exchange information, discuss developments, and decide what they can do to deal with actual events taking place in the real world. In the UK,s view, both proposals directly furthered these objectives. Italy concurred, stressing that Partners understand perfectly well that the MTCR is not the UN but that they have a special responsibility as producers and exporters of missile technology to exercise vigilance with regard to missile proliferation.
33. (C) The U.S. agreed that the MTCR is not a UN implementing body. However, all MTCR Partners are responsible for implementing UNSCRs on a national basis. Nobody has disputed that, nor should they. Consequently, it is appropriate for the MTCR Partners to consider measures, such as those proposed in the U.S. and EU proposals, that would assist Partners in their national implementation of missile-relevant UNSCRs. At the 2006 Copenhagen Plenary, the Partners took the following decision:
-- RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0596 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3833 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0102 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1934 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY S E C R E T SEOUL 000055
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2018 TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, MARR, KS, CH SUBJECT: ROKG TO CONTINUE PRESSURE ON CHINA REGARDING ASAT TEST
REF: A. SECSTATE 1265 B. 07 SEOUL 210
Classified By: A/DCM Patrick Linehan, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (S) On January 8, A/DCM delivered reftel A demarche and nonpaper to Song Young-wan, Director General of the International Organizations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). Song thanked the A/DCM for sharing the planned demarche to China and reiterated the ROKG's concern about China's Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test and frustration about the Chinese Government's failure to adequately respond to international inquiries. Song explained that the ROKG had raised the ASAT test with the Chinese government on numerous occasions since January 2007. Song said that he demarched the Chinese Embassy in Seoul immediately after learning of the test from the U.S. (reported reftel B), at which time the Chinese Foreign Ministry appeared completely unaware of the test. Song also raised the ASAT test at an annual nonproliferation meeting between the two countries in May 2007, when the Chinese Foreign Ministry had a prepared response, insisting the test was in accordance with international norms and that the debris was minimal and posed no significant threat to the satellites of other countries. Song agreed that the Chinese response to international concerns to date had been inadequate and promised the ROKG would continue to press the Chinese Government on the issue. VERSHBOW